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CHAPTER I
WILLIAM JAMES:

INFLUENCES UPON HIS LIFE AND WORK

William James was born on January 11, 1842, in New York City, thua
beginning a full and complex lite which was to pull together in his
person many influences of his time and set loose many more for the time
to come.

His thought and writings grew out of his personal and often

painful search tor truth and meaning and were a blend of his family background, his own interests and studies, and the intellectual milieu of his
time.

T'hese influences combined to make the religious question perhaps

the basic issue of his life.
'.l'he purpose of this stud7 is to focus on the religious question,
beginning with a biograplJ1 of James and moving in the aecond chapter to
his foundations for belief. Over against his ecientific background was
his struggle with the possibility of going beyond strictly scientific
findings, of belieri.ng "be;yond the evidence." In justifying belief in
h1J>otheses that go beyond particular sciences and embrace a more allencompassing world view, he developed his understanding of rationality,
his "sentiment of rationality," including much aore than pure reason.
This consideration of his justification of belief in general will
lead, in the third chapter, to an evaluation of the religious hypothesis
in particular, from the viewpoint of the rationality of individual religious experiences.

An

examination ot !!'!.!. Varieties ,2! Religious

ljlxperience will reveal his conviction that religious experience is not
1

2

something irrational, to be tolerated in those who have not yet outgrown
its need.

And yet it is not rational either, in the sense of a strictly

logical and theoretical rationality.

Rather, religious experience pro-

duces the "sentiment of rationality" that touches both theoretical and
practical reason, the entire human person.
Family influence upon William James begins already with his grandfather William, the first of the James family to come to this country
from Ireland in 1789.

He settled in Alb&.111, New York, where his ambition

and business ability amassed an estate worth three million dollars,
guaranteeing the economio securit7 of his children and grandchildren and
making possible the widespread traveling that was to be an essential part

ot william's education. But the elder william James had also hoped to
transmit his Calvinistic puritanism to his children and grandchildren.
His son Henry and his grandson William each reacted against this Calvinism in his own way, and in time worked out his own religious stance.

But

in them as in other members of the family, the religious conflict contributed to serious mental disorders, as much an inheritance from the elder
William aa his financial estate. 1
William's father, Henry Senior, began already as a child to rebel
against the God ot Calvinism who, he was taught, hated and scowled upon
all the simple joys of nature which were so exhilarating for the young

boy.

He continued to pursue this love of the outdoors, with an uneaai-

nesa about its etfect on his salvation, until a tragic accident cost him
1Edward Carter Moore, William James (New York:

Presa, 1965), 3-7.

waahington Square

3

his leg.

As

a thirteen-year-old school boy helping to put out a fire

caused by an experiment, he was severely burned, resulting in two ampu2
tations above the knee.
His physical movement was now restricted, but he was still very
much alive to the pleasures of his day, acd a cause of concern to his
Calvinistic father.

"His worldly interests and animal spirits were at

war with his humanity, and both were at war with his traditional piet7.'.3
He moved restlessly to various occupations, studied for a time for the
ministry, and finally set out upon a lifetime effort to develop and
articulate hia own religious thought.

His restlessness was geographical

as well as intellectual, and even his marriage and the birth of his first

aon, William, did not keep him from moving back and forth between Albany
and New York City. 4
Along with the task of spreading his religious views, Henry Senior

undertook the education of his children.

He had little faith in schools,

and wanting to prevent the lives of his children from being isolated and
stagnant, he transferred them to several places, including England,
France, and Switzerland for their education.

His interest always was to

develop their talents with the greatest amount of freedom possible.

From

this restless interest of his father in his education, William acquired a
knowledge of French and German and an experience of museums, theaters,

2a.q Wilson Allen, William Jamee (New York: Viking Press, 1967),

6-7
3Ralph Barton Perry, The Thou t and Character of William James:
Briefer Version (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1
, P• 6.

4Allen, william James, P• 10.

and people as well as schools in Europe.5

'l'he restless search for new experiences and situations, then, waa
part of the inheritance passed on to William

b7 his father, along with

an intense interest in the place of rnan in this world and a genuine
religious sensitivity and concern. 6 William would not come to share
the particular religious views of his father, but he would share the
search for religious insight into man, his world, and his God.
It was an already well-traveled William James, then, who returned
from Europe with his family in 186o and settled in Newport, where he
began to study painting in the studio of Morris Hunt.

He had been

sketching and drawing while in Europe, as well as ad.miring works of art,
and he wanted to teat his interest in painting as a career.?

Although

he abandoned the idea within a year, his interest in art had been genu-

ine and left traces on his later philosophical stance.

Even as a phi-

losopher he retained an artistic mind with its interest in the concrete,
particular, and individual, and an impatience with abstractions. 8
His search for a career then brought him in 1861 to Harvard.

He

was already well acquainted with the intellectual movements of his time.

Eaerson in fact had been a frequent visitor to the James residence as

5Bernard P. Brennan, William James ( New York:

Inc., 1968), 24-26.

Twtqne Publishers,

6John J. McDermott, ed., The writings of \riilliam James (New York:
Random House,

1967), xix.

?Brennan, William James, 26-?.

8Allen, 'William James, P• 497.

5

William was growing up, and through l)nerson he met Thoreau.

But James

was not attracted to the transcendental movement, finding its separation
from real life to lead to futility.

Ha:"Vard at that time was a center

for literary celebrities an well, but it was science that James had
chosen to study, building upon an interest he had had from boyhood in
observation and the use of instruments.
His scientific studies revealed a basic quality of his mind, his
eager but impatient search for knowledge.

He could not stay long with

the same task, partly because of poor health but partly because tha
"power of his mind lRY largely in its extreme mobility, its darting,
exploratory impulsiveness.

It was not a mind which remained stationary

• • • but a mind which traveled widely--now here and now there--seeing
all things for iteelf ."9
James began his scientific studies with chemistry, but his teacher,
Charles William Elliot, was soon to notice his frequent "unsystematic
excursions" into other sciences and areas of thought.

From chemiatl"1

he moved to the study of comparative anatomy and peysiology, being partioularly impressed with his teacher, Jeffries Wyman, and his devotion
to truth, his disinterestedness, accuracy, and thoroughness.

10

It was

through "Wyman that Jwnea became interested in evolution, a view he
would eventually have to reconcile with his religious interest.

His

studies next brought him to biology, lending in 1865 to a one-year
9Perry, The 'l'hougl!t and Character of William James: Briefer
VerRion, p.66.

6

expedition to Brazil with Louis Agassiz to collect specimens of marine
animals for the new Agassiz Museum.

But in the meantime, in 1864,

James had entered still another area by beginning studies in the
Medical School.

Throughout this time, while his mind was wandering

restlessly through cbemistey, comparative anat0lll1', biology, to medicine,
it traveled as well through the whole field of literature, history, and
11
philosoplV'•
In addition to reading widely in areas other than science,
he kept up an interest in philosopbJ especially through discussions
with friends, among them Charles Peirce, ChaUD.01 Wright, J;endell Holmes,
and Thomas Ward.

Aa all tour were disposed toward naturalism or acepti-

oism, the contact provided James with a contrast to the strong religious
emphasis of his father. 12
In April of 1867 James again interrupted his medical studies and

sailed for Europe.

His health had not 'been good, plagued as he

was

with

insolmia, trouble with bis stomach, e1es, and back, and at timea deep
depression, all of which contributed to his already natural restleaanesa
and limited the amount of reading and research he could do.

Also, he

had become interested in experimental plV'siology at the Medical Sohool,
and he hoped by going to Gerrr&an7 to pursue that interest and perfect bis

knowledge of German. 13

He

returned to America in November, 1868, con-

tinued his medical studies at Harvard, and passed his medical exam on

June 21, 1869.
11

Ibid., P• 71.

12
Ibid., P• 78.

13Ibid., P• 79.
-

7

In April, 1870, William James underwent a spiritual crisis which
was to be a turning point in his life. His spirits had been low tor
maey reasons, including again his poor health, but the real basis tor

the crisis was "the ebbing of the will to live, for lack of a philoaopey
to live by-a paralysis ot action occasioned by a sense of moral impotenoe."14 James had studied science tor several years, and he was well
acquainted with the materialists and determinists of his time and their
reduction of emotional and mental processes to the blind operation of
1
mechanical f'orces. 5 But he could not accept the "iron blocklf universe
of' the determiniats, nor what appeared to be the closed systems of Kant,
Hegel, Leibniz, and much of the philosophical tradition, in which all the
parts are so formed that all future conditions and combinations are
settled. He needed a universe where man was not mora.l.JJ' impotent, but
rather could make a dif terence by his choices and his actions.

It was

especialq by reading Charles Renouvier whom he had met in F'rance that

he was now able to save himself' from despair and possible suicide by
deliberately choosing to believe in free will: 16
I think that yesterda;y was a crisis in my lite. I finished
the first part of Renouvier's second Essaia and see no reason
why his definition of free will-"the Sll8taining of a thought
because I ohooae to when I might have other thoughts"-need
be the definitionof an illusion. At any rate, I will assume
14
Ibid., P• 120.

-

15Allen, William James, P• 501.
16
Ibid., P• 498.

8

for the preaent--until next year--that it is no illusion.
My ti;,t act of tree will shall be to believe in tree
will.
This personal crisis was also important for James in his lite as a

philosopher.

That the crisis could only be relieved by a philosophical

insight indicates what was to be the role of philosop}'q' in his life.
Philoaopey for James would always be an intensely personal search, always a part of life and living, never pure theory.

Hia gradual and

painful resolution of this crisis also indicated the type of philosoptq'
that would draw him on.
accept it as inevitable.

He could not ignore evil, nor tolerate it, nor
"Ho philosop}\y could possibly suit him that did.

not cruididly recognize the dubious fortunes of mankind, and encourage him
as a moral individual to buckle on his armor and go forth to battle. 1118
Once he had rejected suicide and freely chosen the possibility of

a creative life and a world open to man's activity, his career of teaching and writing would be a search to discover the truth of this belief.
In August, 1872, he became an instructor in ph;yaiology at Harvard, where

he was to move to psycholoa and eventually

philosop~.

All of his

studies during this period were interrelated and influenced his approach.
His work in medicine,

anat~,

and physiology, for example, would not let

him be satisfied with the current approach to psychology, stressing the

soul and ignoring the body. 19 He felt a need in hia psychology tor a
more experime&tal and scientific approach.

17Perr;y, The T~ougb.t and Character of William James: Briefer
Version, P• 121.
18
Ibid., P• 122

-

19Brennan, William James, P• 39.

9

At the same time he waa veJ:'1 interested in evolution and its contributions to science as well as its challenge to religion.

His studies

had been strongly soientitic, and yet his background had been
religious.

stro~

His ovn personal crisis convinced him of the need to move

beyond purely scientific evidence, while remaining faithful to its findings, and working out this delicate balance would engage his energies
for years to come.

Above all, James brought to hie teaching and writing

the same restlessness of mind that had characterized his years of study.
"James•s ovn character and temperament needed change, novelty, and freedom for healthy existence, and his own experience had convinced. him that

he lived in a world in which they could and should operate.',20
James•s development as a philosopher, therefore, was closely tied
to his personal life.

He reflected on his own experience, and attempted

to provide philosophical understanding of that experience.

His pro-

tessional training was not in philosophy, however, and at times he appears
weak on what other philosophers had written.

At times too be uses tel'llll

such as "truth" ambiguously, sometimes with the connotations these terms
have acquired in the historzr of

philosop~,

sometimes with new meanings

he has given them.

In July, 1878, James married Alice Gibbens, who contributed greatly
to his happiness and the success

or

his career.

Her interest,

sympat~,

and concern helped him through the years of intense activity inter-

mingled with poor health, balancing with her composure his high-strung
20
Allen, william James, P• 516.

10

mobility and restlessness.

21

With her help he was able to pursue a

career of teaching, writing, and lecturing, searching

relentless~

for insights into man and hie relation to his world, and sharing
these insights with students, colleagues, and friends with his own
mixture of clarity, depth, charm, and humor.
21 Perry, The Thou6ht and Character of William James: Briefer
Versio~ P• 145.

CHAPT.i!;!~

FOUNDATIONS:

II

THE RATIONALITY OF .BELIEF

William Jamea'e restless mind and his need for no\•elty would
hardly have been satisfied with the findings of science alone or the
workings of pure and abstract reason.

Furthermore, his personal

crisis of 1870 convinced him of the need to choose beyond the scientific

evidence in order to find a reason to live.

In several lectures given

between 188o and 1896 he worked out his "belief in belief, 11 his juatification for the conviction that at times it was permissible and even
necessary to go beyond scientific evidence, to believe and act ac-

cordingly rather than waitiug for all the evidence to appear and convince
the mind.
Believe.

---

In 1897 he collected these and other essays in The Will to

In the preface he mentioned the first four essays as being

"largely concerned with defending the legitimacy of religious faith. n1
These will be the focus of our attention.
The title essay, ''The Will to Believe," provides us above all
with a description of the role belief in general actually plays in our
lives.

Beginning with a definition of terms, James points out that an

hypothesis is aizything that may be proposed to our belief, and may be
either live or dead.

"A live hypothesis is one that appeals aa a real

1i.1111iam Janes, The Will to Believe and other Eas
Philosop!ly (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 19
11

s in P

12

possibility to him to whom it is proposed, 1.2 the deadness and liveness
being relative to the individual thi.Dker and measured by his willingness to act upon the
is an option.

~othesis.

The decision between two hypotheses

Options in turn may be living or dead, forced or

avoidable, momentous or trivia1.

A living option is one in which

both hypotheses are live, such as "Be an agnostic or be a Christian,"
both of which would be understandable and possible for us to act upon.
A forced option would be a choice baaed on a complete logical dis-

juntion, with no possibility of not choosing-e.g., "Either accept
this truth or go without it."

HEither love me or hate me" would not

be a forced option, as a person could avoid that choice by remaining

indifferent.

A momentous option is one which involves a unique oppor-

tunity, a significant investment, and an irreversible decision.

A

genuine option, in James•s terms, will then be an option that is living,
forced, and momentous.'
Against this background Jamee considers "the actual psychology

ot human opinion," how we form our convictions and the role in the

pro-

cess of our "passional and volitional nature" on the one hand and our
intellect on the other.

It is important to note here that James does

not use the term "nature" in the technical sense in which it has been
used in the history of
clear~

2

philosop~.

It does not refer to any kind ot

defined and distinct faculty or source of operations in a sub-

-

Ibid., P• 2.

3Ibid., 2-4.

13

stantive sense.

In some ways, James continues, it seems "simply silly"

to talk. of ''believing by our volition," as if our will could either
help or hinder our intellect in its perceptions of truth.
8.1J3 effort of our will, or b7

~

"Can we, by

strength of wish that it were true,

believe ourselves well and about when we are roaring with rheumatism
in bed?"4 Furthermore, allowing our paasional and volitional nature
into the picture seems rlle as well as silly when we consider "the
magnificent edifice of the pJ:v'aical sciences," built upon the lives of
men who remained disinterested and impersonal, not yielding to preference or sentiment or their 1'passional nature," but submitting "to the
icy laws of outer fact.'.5 Freil this point of view, then, it would

seem that as we form our convictions and opinions, wishing and willing
are merely "fifth wheels to the coach. ,p
And 7et, if we would then assume that pure reason alone is what
settles our opinions, we would "fly quite as directly in the teeth of
the facts."

It is true that our willing nature cannot bring back to

life ey-potheses that are already dead for us.

But what has made them

dead for us is usually a previous action of our willing nature of an
antagonistic kind.

"Willing nature" tor James includes "all such factors

of belief as !ear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, the circumpreesure of our caste and set."?

4Ibid.,

-

P• ,;.

5Ibid., P• 7.

6Ibid.,

P• 8.

7Ibid.,

P• 9.

-

And all these factors,

14

he maintains, have an influence upon which hypotheses we in fact conaider alive and which dead.
Very often indeed we accept opinions because of their prestige
more than their inner clearness, and our reason is often satisfied "it
it can find a few arguments that will do to recite in ease our credulity

is criticised by someone elae."8 Even our belief in truth itselt, our
conviction that there is such a thing as truth and our minds are made

tor it, is affected by our willing nature.

We want to believe that our

experiments and studies bring us closer to the truth and we agree to
proceed accordingly.

But if a sceptic asks ua how we know there is

such a thing as truth, we cannot prove it logically.
volition against another.

It is just one

Finally, we tend to disbelieve all tacts and

theories for which we have no use.

Huxley, tor example, has no use for

bishops and sacerdotaliam in his life and theretore disbelieves, while
Newman finds a need for the same priestly system and ''finds all sorts

ot reasons

good f'or staying there."9

It seems clear, then, that non-intellectual forces influence our

which our convictions are in fact formed, pure insight

convictions.

In the actual psychology of human opinion, the way in

play the only role.

--

But is this actual situation also pathological and

reprehensible, or is it to be accepted as normal?
thesis of the essay:

8

Ibid., P• 9.

9Ibid., P• 10.

-

and logic do not

This brings us to the

15

Our passional nature not only lavtully may, but must, decide
an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine
option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual
grounds; for to 88:1• under such circumstances, "Do not decide,
but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision,
--just like deciding yes or no1a-and is attended with the
same risk of losing the truth.

In doing "a bit more of preliminary work" before tackling the thesis,
Jamea points out that he is consciously rejecting scepticism and notes the

two wa;ys we can hold that our minds can indeed find truth.

The absolutists

-

claim that they can know the truth and know for certain that th91 know it,
while the empiricists maintain that although they f1a1 attain truth they
cannot infallibly know when. 11 James rejects the objective certitude ot
the absolutists and denies that the intellect has 8.D1 infallible signal tor
knowing when it has the truth.

This does not mean that the empiricist

gives up the quest tor truth.

He still believes that he gains "an e'V'er

better position towards it by systematically continuing to roll up experiences and think. 1112 But rather than expecting to know for certain that an
hypothesis is true, he says that ''if the total drift of thinking continues
to confirm it, that is what he means by its being true."13
James then states the two great commandments for would-be knowers:
"We IDU8t know the truth; and we must avoid error."14 But, he points out,

----

--------

these are two separable laws, and our emphasis on one or the other colore
10Ibid.,
P• 11.
11 Ibid.,
12

P• 12.

Ibid. 1 P• 17

1'Ibid.
14Ibid.

16

our whole intellectual lite.

Our primary concern may be to avoid error

at all costa, and never risk belief on insufficient evidence, or we may
feel that approaching real knowledge is worth the risk of sometimes
being in error.

But again, the choice between the two attitudes is not

decided on strictly logical grounds but on the basis of our 0 passional
life." James, who had al.ready indicated that empiricism was his approach,
also comes down on the side of an active search for truth, being willing
to live with the risk of error.
Against this background of the actual influence of our passional
nature, Jamee continues hia discussion of the legitimacy of this situation.

He grants that at times it is best to vait for more evidence and

not risk error, especially in scientific questions, which
trivial options for us spectators.

"
ample, of a theory of the Rontgen

re~

are

We are not so much in need, for exr~s

the other before the evidence is in.

that we must decide one

wiry

or

The same is not true for the soi-

entist himself, however, who is not just a spectator, no matter how impersonal. and objective he mq think he is.

While he must remain true

to the tacts, the investigation is helped along if he has a '*passion.ate"
desire to get his own faith confirmed.

"If you want an absolute duffer

in an investigation, you must, after all, take the man who has no interest whatever in ita results.n1.5

But, asks James, are there not sometimes forced options, times
when we must decide

w~thout

15Ibid., P• 21.

-

waiting for more evidence, especially if our

17

main interest is to gain truth and not just avoid error?

Moral ques-

tions in particular come to mind as questions whose solution cannot

wait for sensible proof.

"Science can tell us what exists; but to

compare the worths, both of what exists and of what does not exist, we
must consult not science, but what Pascal calls our heart."16 In moral
questions there is no chance of waiting for scientific evidence, as

there is no scientific evidence to wait for.

Even to decide whether to

have or not have moral beliefs is done by our will.

Moral scepticism can no more be refuted or proved by logic
than intellectual scepticifJll can. When we stick to it that
there .!! truth (be it of either kind), we do so with our
whole nature, and resolve to stand or fall by the results. 17
Furthermore, in some questions, such as those regarding personal
relations, waiting for the evidence may be self-defeating.

If I am won-

dering whether you like me, the result may depend on my assuming it and
meeting you halt way.
The previous faith on my part in your liking's existence is
in such cases what makes your lil<ing come. But if I stand
aloof, and refuse to budge an inch until I have obj,8tive
evidence, • • • ten to one your lilcing nevar comes.
There can be tilles, then, when faith in something helps bring it about.

Jamee concludes, "In truths dependent on our personal action, then,
faith baaed on desire is certain.1.J a lawful and possibly an indispensable thing."19

16Ibid., P• 22.

-

17

Ibid., P• 23.

18Ibid., 23-4.

19

-

Ibid., P• 25.

18

Therefore, what James provides us in the first part ot the essay
is a psychology of human opinion, a description of how we actuaJ.11
!orm our convictions, emphasizing that non-intellectual forces do have
a place, even in the supposedly "passionless" sphere of science.

Logi-

cal reasoning alone cannot decide the options that determine our stance
toward the world:

scepticism, or the ability to know truth; absolutism

or empiricism; an emphasis on seeking truth• or trying above all to
avoid error.

And in many other cases we not only may but must believe

beyond the evidence or risk the loss of truth or good by our inactivity.
At times our belief can even help create the truth.
This essay gives us an indication of James's understanding of
truth. which receives further development in later works as his pragmatic theory of truth.

At times he uses the term ambiguously, but the

important point here is that truth for him is not an absolute which can
be clearly recognized when it is attained.
James does consider the religious h1J>othesis to aome extent in
this essay, but we will find a fuller treatment of it in two other essays.

First, however, we will give further attention to the legitimacy

of belief in general as described in "The Sentiment or Rationality."
To attain "a conception of the frame of things which shall on the
whole be more rational than that somewhat chaotic view which every one
by nature carries about with him under his hat,',20 is the task which

philosophers set themselves to perform.
20

-

Ibid., P• 63.

But how does the philosopher

19

recognize this rationality when he attains it?

As

he recognizes every-

thing else, James replies, by certain subjective marks with which it atfects him.

"A strong feeling of ease, peace, rest, is one of them.

The transition from a state of puzzle and perplexity to rational comprehension is full of lively relief and pleasure."21 Actually this feeling

......

of rationality is mainly an absence of irrationality.

Just as we feel

no particular pleasure when we breathe freely but notice immediately if
there is any obstruction of our breathing, so too our thoughts ID81 seem
to flow effortlessly until we meet with some difficulty which strikes
us as irrational and stops the !lov.

It is this flow of the mind 'With-

out the jarring of irrationality, this feeling of "the sufficiency of
the present moment, • • • this absence of all need to explain it,
account for it, justify it," that James calls "the

~entiment

of Ration-

al~.~
One way
As

or

obtaining this fluency of thought is the theoretic way.

we face the sensible diversity of facts in the world, we have a theo-

retie need tor unity, a need to see that the chaos before u.e is the
expression of more simple underlying facts, to see for example that such
apparently diverse objects as the moon and an apple are similar in their
relation through gravity to the earth.

By seeing similarities and find-

ing simplicity we can handle the original data with less mental effort. 23
Alongside this paasion for simplification there exists the passion
21

Ibid ••
...........

P• 63.

22Ibid.,

P• 64.

..............

23Ibid.,
P• 65.
............

20

tor distinguishing, the impulse to be acquainted with the parts rather
than to comprehend the whole.

This passion

loves to recognize particulars in their full completeness,
and the more of these it can carry the happier it is.

It

prefers 8If3 amount of incoherence • • • to an abstract way
of conceiving things that, while it simplifies them, i!issolves away at the same time their concrete .fulness. 2
Both or these demands must be met, and the combination in a
particular person will determine his philosophic attitude.

But the

only we.y to balance this diversity and unity is to classify the
diverse items as cases of a common essence discovered in them.

This

determines the characteristic of a theoretic philoeoph1:
A completed theoretic philosophy can thus never be anything
more than a completed classification of the world's ingredients; and its results must always be abstract, since
the basis of every classification is the abstract essence
embedded in the living fact,--the rest of the 5iving fact
being for the time ignored by the classifier. 2
It is this necessity of ignoring "the rest of the living fact"
that causes the theoretic approach its difficulty.

Arq single explana-

tion ot a fact will be limited necessarily to that single point of
view, leaving out the rest of real lite.

At times this theoretic

approach is helpful and even necessary, but its simple classification
of things is "a most miserable and inadequate substitute for the fulnees of truth, • • • a monstrous abridgment of life, which, like all
abridgments is got by the absolute loss and casting out of real
matter. ,-26

While the theoretic approach can serve a purpose, ordi-

24
Ibid., P• 66.

-

25Ibid.,
26

-

P• 67.

Ibid., P• 69.
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narily a person will talce nothing as a substitute for life but living
itself.
The inability of the theoretic approach to satisfy a person completely brings James to the practical side of rationality.

He begins

by looking for a "definition of the world which will give back to the
mind the free motion which has been blocked in a purely contemplative
path ••• ["andJ make the world seem rational again." 27 It is conceivable that there could be several views of the world all consistent with
the facts and satisfying to our purely logical needs.

If so, one that

would awaken our "active impulses" or satisfy other aesthetic demands
better than the others would be the more rational·one, the one more
capable of providing the mind with fluency.

James then describes the

tests of rationality our aesthetic and practical nature would use in
evaluating these several systems equally satisfying to our logical
needs.
First of all, it seems "that mere familiarity with things is able
to produce a feeling of their rationality.u 28 When we become accustomed to a thing, so that our mind can pass easily from it back to its
antecedents and ahead to its consequents and around to the things with
which it is related, then this fluency of our mind tinges the thing
with the rational character.

But it is especially the relation of a

thing to its future consequences that is important.
27 Ibid., P• 75.

28 Ib·d

--!...• t P• 76 •

Our consciousness
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alwoys contains an ingredient of expectancy, which we notice most when
there is something either vecy painful or vecy pleasant impending.
Bspecia.lly impending pain keeps us from being at
the present.

pea~e

and at home in

Even uncertainty about the future can be unsettling, and

the experience of coming to feel at home in a new place or with new
people is the gradual lessening of the uncertainty and its accompanying
uneasiness.

As

we become acquainted with the range of possibilities in

the new place and with the new people, the feeling of strangeness
lessens and we begin to feel at home.29
A philosophical conception of the universe, if it is to be accepted as rational, must also at least in a general way banish uncertainty from the future.

Buch an attempt to satisfy expectancy has al-

ways been a fundamental part of ultimate explanations ot the universe.
There lll81 be views which emphasize the uncertainty of the future, but
these generally will be reactions to overly-confident optimistic views.
For the moat part it can be said that the first test our practical and
aesthetic nature would use in evaluating a conception of the universe
is its ability to define expectancy, to describe the future at least in
a general wa:y.30 Man needs a conception ot what the universe is like
which includes some kind of assurance that basically and generally the
universe will continue to be as it is.

Such a view does not eliminate

the possibility of change, but assures a person that the changes will

29 Ibid., 77-8.

-

30Ibid., 79-82.
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not be so radical that he cannot handle them.
But it is not enough for our nature to de&cribe the future; it
must do so in a Wa:.f that is congruent with our powera.

A pessimistic

philosophy that tells people the future is incompatible with thei1· desires and active tendencies will be to most men a source of more uneasiness than uncertainty itself.
that our efforts are hopeless.

Better not to kn.ow• than to know

"But a second and worse defect in a

philosophy than that of contradicting our active propensities is to
give them no object whatever to press against.'.31 A philosoph;y that
suggests no future to work for leaves man's most intimate powers with
no object.

"A nameless unheimlichkeit comes over us at the thought of

there being nothing eternal in our final purposes, in the objects ot
those loves

and.

aspirations which are our deepest energies."32

Down

through history great achievements have resulted from man being challenged to uae his active powers, with the promise that the future was
indeed in some perhaps yet unforseen way compatible with those powers.
This ability of a philosophy to describe the future in a wa:y that
challenges man's abilities will be the second test used by our practical and aesthetic nature in evaluating various views.

Personal tempera-

ment enters in here, though, and different men will insist on being
spoken to in different wa:ys, since men•a active impulses are so differently mixed.33

-

31Ibid., P• 82.
32Ibid., P• 83.

-

33Ibid., 88-9.
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The consideration of the sentiment of rationality in its practical
aspect now brings us to an element of our activG nature which "philosophers as a rule have with great insincerity tried '.:o huddle out of
sight in their pretension to found systems of absolute certainty.
mean the element of faith.',34

I

James takes faith to mean

belief in something concernine which doubt is still theoretically possible; and aa the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to
act in a cause the pro~erous issue of which ia not certified to us in advance.
Faith is a necessary ingredient in our mental attitude.

Dven

scientific philosophers admit this, but by a. "singularly arbitrary
caprice they say that it is only legitimate when used in the interests
of one particular proposition,--the proposition, namely, that the
course of nature is uniform.',36 This basis !or scientific investigation
is a working hypothesis, accepted in the beginning on taith.

And yet

the same attitude ot faith in other areas is, according to some scientist::s, illogical and even shameful.

But we cannot live or think at all

without some degree of faith, some willingness to accept a "working
hypothesis" and act upon it, expecting the results to disappoint us if'
our assumption has been false.37
This brings us to a crucial point in James's argument in this

Yi- Ibid., P• 90.
35 Ibid.,

P• 90.

36 Ibid.,

P• 91.

37Ibid.,

P• 95.
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eBS81t similar to his conclusion in the previous one, that

belief (as measured by action) not only does and must
continuall.7 outstrip scientific evidence, but that there
is a certain class of truths of whose realit;y belief is
a factor as well as a confessor; and that as regards this
class of truths faith is not only licit and pertinent,
but essential and indispensable. The,gruths cannot become
true till our faith has made them so.
Again, there are areas where .faith has no role.

''The future move-

ments ot the stars or the facts of past history are determined now once

for all, whether I like them or not • ..39 But there are other .facts that
are not yet determined, and their determinations will depend in part on
'ffl1 personal contribution.

This contribution demands a certain amount

ot subjective energy which in turn calls tor at least some faith that
the result will be attained.

Take for example the view ot the world as

either optimistic or pessimistic.

I can look at the misery, wickedness,

and pain in the world, conclude that it is hopeless, and stop trying to

change the situation.

In so doing I am helping in 1ll1 own, perhaps

small, W81 to make true this belief.

But if I look at the same tacts

with the belief that something can be done about the evils in the world
and

this belief touches my energies and prompts me to try to change the

situation, then my belief in the optimistic view of the world is helping

to make that view true.

In situations like this where belief contributes

to truth, it is ridiculous to say that belief has no place.4o
'l'he investigation now comes to what James calls the radical ques-

38Ibid., P• 96.

-

-

39Ibid., P• 97.
4oIbid.,

-

10C>-2.
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tion of lite, "whether this be at bottom a moral or an unmoral universe."41

Does faith have a role in determining this fundamental

issue? This really is the question ot materialism, which James
summarizes as follows:
Is the world a simple brute actuality, an existence 2
facto about which the deepest thing that can be said
is that it happens so to be; or is the judgment of
better or worse, ot oupt, as intimately perti~nt to
phenomena as the simple judgment is or is not?

-

For the materialist, the words "good" and

-"bad"

have no meaning

"apart from subjective passions and interests which we may, it we
please, play fast and loose with at wil1.n43 When his feelings are at
war with the tacts around him, he "is always free to seek barmoJV" by
toning down the sensitiveness of the feelings. n44 But for the moralist
there are certain things which not only !!:!. but o¢t to be, and when
there is a claah with the world he cannot simply gain
ficing his ideal interests.

harmo~

by sacri-

There are therefore times when the two

views will call tor different action, and it is this difference in
behavior that assures us that we have here a meaningful issue. 45
Each view will call upon us to live its eypothesis and judge by
our experience that it is the true one.

41~•• P• 103.
42

4
-

Ibid.

'Ibid.

44Ibid.,

P• 1o4.

45Ibid.,
P• 105.

-

And we can expect in a question

of this scope that "the experience of the entire human race must make
the verification, and that all the evidence will not be 'in' till • • •
the last man has had his aay. 046 Then it will be clear whether this
was "at bottom a moral or an unmoral universe."

But in the meantime

our initial faith certainly has a role to play.

If we belieYe that it

.!!. a moral universe where 'good'

and 'better' apply, and then we live

according to this belier. we are helping to create a moral universe just
as certainly as our initial belief in an "unmoral" universe will help

to create that one.

Certainly we cannot keep our faith out of the

question and doubt.

To doubt that the universe is moral and therefore

not act is in effect to

de~

that it is moral.

What James provides in this essay ia a description of his meaning

ot "rationality" and how the mind recognizes it.

In the history of

philosophy, rationality connotes universal and necessary knowledge,
with an emphasis on thought and logical reasoning.

James opposed this

conception of rationality, especially as he felt it was embodied in the
systematic and theoretical philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Leibniz, and
others.

This type of rationality puts too much emphasis on thought

alone and separates it too distinctly from feeling.

Jamea•s key phrase,

the sentiment of rationality, indicates that for him feeling and thought
are part of the same context, intertwined in man's experience.
indicated this earlier in!!!!_ Principles

.2! Psyoholog;r,

He had

pointing out the

similarity of feeling and thought in that both are part ot cognition. 47
46

4

Ibid., P• 107.

'lwilliam James, The Principles of Psycbolog;r (New York: Dover
Publications, Inc., 1950), Vol. I, P• 222.
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In the present

ess~

he states that rationality is recognized

feeling ot ease and peace it arouses in a person.
James is much more than thought alone.

b7 the

Rationalit1 tor

It is closer perhaps to the

feeling a person has when he finds that his experience makes sense
or is reasonable, when he is able to deal with that experience without
being jarred b7 inconsistencies.
Rationality as James understands it is the key term in this
study.

The present chapter is a description of James•s view that

belief in general and religious belief in particular are reasonable
in the sense of producing this sentiment of rationality.

The third

chapter will examine particular religious experiences to determine
their rationality in this broader Jamesian sense.
Essential to his view is the role of the practical reason in maintaining the fluency of thought which he takes to be rationality.

Im-

portant too is the description of the inner needs of man that must be
met by a philosophic view, demanding of a system of thought not just
logical consistency, but the ability to describe the future at least
in a general way and in a manner that encourages a person's abilities.
Faith is an essential element in this practical W81 of conceiving the
universe, and in

~

questions, including the basic character or the

universe, faith in a view can help to make it true.
A further description ot the basic needs or man in determining
his world view is given in the essay "Is Life worth Living?" It indicates as well what religion can do, positively and negatively, in
meeting these basic needs.
James notes that some people would answer the question "Is life

29

worth living?"

with an enthusiastic "yes" because of their built·in

optimism and their inability to believe that
can exist.

~thing serious~

evil

But this is hardly universal, and in fact "the whole 8r1f11

His
in this essay is to formulate what we might sa:y to a person who

of suicides" declare that sometimes life is not worth living.
goal

is weary of life with that

"metap~sical

tedium vitae which is pe-

culiar to reflecting men," that pessimism that can come from "too

much questioning and too little active responaibility. 048
In describing this weariness and this pessimism James makes

clear that he feels it is a religious disease with its reflective
source in "the contradiction between the phenomena of nature and the
craving of the heart to believe that behind nature there is a spirit
whose expression nature

is."49

The religious man naturally tends to

look at the universe and expect to !ind there traces of the wisdom
and goodness of the God who made it.

But in looking at nature and

the real world he finds so much hideousness with the beauty, so much
cruelty with the love, and so much death with lite.

It ia in this

contradiction "between the supposed being of a spirit that encompasses
and owns us • • • and the character of such a spirit as revealed b)'
the visible world's course',50 that the pessimism and melancholy lie.
Some men might be able to shrug off or ignore this evil and this
contradiction, but not the man for whom the "religious craving" is

48James, The Will to Believe and other Es!&s in Po;pular
PhilosopbJ, 38-9.

49Ibid., P• 4o.

-

50Ibid., P• 42.

real.
This leads, James feels, to

11

the inevitable bankruptcy of natural

religion" with its proofs for a "Moral and Intelligent Contriver of the
World."

We know the evil of nature as well as the good, and we can

hardly worship unreservedly a God whose adequate expression would be
that nature.

Either there is no God revealed in nature, or he is in-

adequately revealed; and "what we call visible nature, or

~

world,

must be but a veil and surface-show whose full meaning resides in a supplementary unseen or other world."51
In fact, says James, the first step toward getting into a health1'
relationship with the universe may be to rebel against this God of
natural religion who is tied so directly to the evil of the world.

It

is precisely the implied contradiction between such a supposedly good
God and a world mixed with evil that causes the pessimism and melanchol.1
in the religious man.

The existence of that kind of God results in a

"monistic'' view, with God as the "one and only Power" who must therefore
be the explanation of the evil as well as the good.

But if a person can

be emancipated from this "monistic superatition,n then he can take on
the evils of the world individually without having to worry about their
derivation trom the "one and only Power."52 Just this emancipation
might encourage the person whose pessimism has made him weary of lite to
go on living now, since the evils he faces are finite ones that he can

help to overthrow.

51 Ibid., 4,3-4.

52

-Ibid., P• 46.
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Eliminating an inadequate view of religion such as this frees a
man, but is there an;ything more positive that religion itself can do to
offset this pessimism and weariness of life?

Religion and religious

faith refer here essentially to the belief "in the existence of an unseen
order of some kind in whioh the riddles of the natural order mq be found
explained. 053 James•s thesis is
that we have a right to believe the p~sical order to be
only a partial order; that we have a right to supplement
it by an unseen spiritual order which we aasume on trust,
if o~4thoreby life ~ seem to us better wortn living

again.

The mushrooming of dieooveries in science itself indicates that we
have had only a glimpse of what the universe will

event~

prove to be,

and therefore "the world of our present natural knowledge .!!,. enveloped

in a larger world of .!2!!. sort of whose residual properties we at present
can frame no positive idea.n55 While admitting that, agnostic positivism
tells us that we have no right to suppose a!J1thing about that unseen part
until we have sensible evidence; we can dream no dreams, form no eypotheses or beliefs.
the unknown.
religious

Such neutrality might be possible if we had no stake in

But both doubt and belief involve conduct; doubting the

~pothesis

it were untrue.

while waiting for more evidence means living as if

Furthermore, this neutrality demands that our inner

interests have no real connection with the forces that the hidden world
11181 contain.

Even if we have an inner need of believing that this world

53Ibid., P• 51.

54Ibid., P• 52.

-

55Ibid., P• 51+.

of nature is only a sign of something more spiritual and eternal, poaitiviam would forbid us to act upon it, although the inner demand on the
part of scientists for logical harmol\Y in the

univer~e

has led them to

many scientific discoveries.

Science, then, has no authority to tell us not to trust our inner
need to go beyond the visible world.

And trusting our religious demands

means living in the light of them, acting "as if the invisible world

they suggest were real. ,,56

If' we could be certain that our bravery and

patience in facing adversity in this lite were bearing fruit somewhere
in an unseen spiritual world, even the most adverse life would seem
worth living.

We cannot be certain, and yet scie110e cannot show this

belief to be impossible, and we are free to trust it at our own risk.
Furthemore, "optimism and pessimism are definitions of the world, and
• • • our own reactions on the world, small as they are in bulk, are
integral parts of the whole thing, and necessarily help to determine the

definition. ,.57
James admits that there are

~

"mqbes" connected with believing

and acting upon the religious }\y'pothesis.

But it can give meaning to

our lives to believe that by our actions something is eternally gained
for the universe, and that even the visible order of goodness we believe
in we can help to create.

If we believe in the depths of our being and

are eager to enter the fight, then the scientific veto will sound like
"mere chattering ot the teeth.'..58

6
' Ibid., P• 56.

-

57Ibid.,

P• 60.

58Ibid., P• 62.
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This essay, therefore, does more than indicate that it is perraiasible to believe; it points out what belief can do to make a person's
life worth living.

Once the reflective person has

b~en

freed from the

"monistic superstition" and sees that the evils of the world can be
dealt with singly, the religious eypothesis can challenge his powers to
work for a better world, trusting that his courage

may

be bearing fruit

in an unseen order and helping to create the good he believes in.

The

emphasis is on the inner need ot the person to believe, more than the
rationale of the religious eypothesis itself.

Religious belief does

not go against the facts, but conceivably at this point there could also
be other hypotheses to challenge a person's powers and make life worth
living.
The fourth essay, "Reflex Action and Theism," will concentrate

more directly on the religious hypothesis as the one which beat meets
the basic needs of man.

Early in the essay James summarizes what people

generally know of the theory of reflex action.

In

p~si.ological

terms

it means that "the acts we perform are always the result of outward discharges from the nervous centres, and that these outward discharges are
themselves the result of impression.a from the external world, carried in
along one or another of our sensory nerves."59
From being applied at first to just a portion o:f our behavior, the
theory has been generalized to explain all human behavior.

The struc-

tural, unit of the nervous system is seen to form a triad, with sensory

impression existing only to awaken the central process of reflection•
..,hich in turn exists only for the sake of action.
elements can function independently.

£'ven the middle stage of contem-

plation or thinking is only a "place of transit."
roots in the outer

~orld

None of the three

If it would not have

or would not result in active measures, it

would not be fulfilling its function.

''The current of life which runs

in at our eyes or ears is meant to run out at our hands, feet, or lips. 1160
All three have a role, but perception and thinking exiat for the sake
of behavior.
In beginning to apply the speculative consequences of this theory

to theism, James notea in passing that some writers feel that reflex
action gives

'~ £.2.S?_ 2

e:ace to the superstition of a God. 1161

chooses not to enter this debate about the existence of God.

He

Rather•

!l.e will try to show that if' the human mind is actually a triadic

structure of impression, reflection, and reaction as the reflex action
theory indicates, then "a God, whether existent or not, is at all events

the kind of being which, if he did exist, would

form!!!!,~ adequa~e

possible object tor minds framed like our own to conceive as lying at
the root of the universe."

62

In other words, some outward reality de-

tined as God's nature must be clefined, "is the only ultimate object
that is at the same time rational and possible for the human mind's
60
Ibid., P• 114.

-

61~•• P• 115.

62 Ibid.

-
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contemplation. 1163 Theism then becomes "the centre of gravity ot all
attempts to solve the riddle of life,--eome falling below it by defect,
some flying above it by excess, itself alone satisfying every mental

need in strictly normal measure."64
This will be, James realizes, a subjective consideration of
theisra, based on its congruity with our nature as thinkers.

The ob-

jective side ot theism, God's actual existence, is left untouched.
God

If

''be real.JJ the living truth," this will indicate that the structure

ot our mind is actually in accordance with the nature of reality.
Whether this be the case or not is, according to James, "one of those
questions that belong to the province of personal faith to deoide."65
The structure of our mind needs God; whether he actually exists, each
person is entitled to doubt or to believe on his own responsibilit7 and
at his own risk.
Before defining God and theism and undertaking the proof of his
thesis, James mentions a consequence of the reflex theory of mind that
he feels not even all pb1siologiats recognize, namely that "it commits
them to regarding the mind as an essentially teleological mechanism. n 66
In other words, the mind's middle department, the conceiving or theorizing taculty, functions solely for the sake of ends "that do not exist

at all in the world of impressions we receive b,- way of our senses, but

63Ibid., P• 116.
64Ibid.

65Ibid.

-

66 Ibid.,

-

P• 117.

are set by our emotional and practical subjectivity altogether."67 The
conceiving faculty transforms the world of our impressions into a
totallJ' di!ferent world, the world of our conception, and this remodeling of the "brute order of our experience" is done in accordance with

our 'fl\rolitional nature," which includes our subjective purposes,
preferences, and our fondness for certain effects, forms and orders. 68
The sum of our actual experience at any given moment .!!! it is
given is utter chaos.

From the mixture of sounds, colors, forms, and

the various feelings aroused in us we have to pick out "the items which
concern ws, and connecting them wit.h others far awa:t 1 which we se:y 'belong• with them, we are able to make out definite threads of sequence
and tendency; to foresee particular liabilities and get ready for them;

6

and to enjoy simplicity and harmorq in place of what was chaos. n 9

We

talce the real order of the world with all its chaos and "we break it
into histories, and we brealc it into arts, and we brealc it into
sciences; and then we begin to feel at home."70 But we do this for
our own purposes, in reapon.oe to our own concerns, postulating that
there is a harmony between our "volitional nature" and the nature ot
things.

This the theologian doee, no less and no more than the artist

or the man of science.

In coming then to the question regarding the kind of being God

67Ibid

-·
69
-

68 Ibid.,

117-8.

Ibid., P• 118.

-

70ibid., P• 119.

would be if he did exist, the first step is to sort out the essential
features from among the many meanings the word
the histor,y of human thought.

'God'

has taken on in

Setting aside the many sectarian dis-

putes about the attributes o! God and his metaph1aical relation to
the phenomenal world, James lists as the essential features of theism,
first, that "God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and,
second, he must be conceived under the form of a mental personalit7."71
Mainly this means that God's personalit7

la to be regarded, like SD1 other personality, as something
~ing outside of my own and other than me, and whose existence
I simp~ come upon and find. A power not ourselves, then,
which not only makes tor righteousness, but means it, and
which recognizes us,-auch is the d,£inition which I think
nobody will be inclined to dispute.
There have been of course various attempts to fill out the description

or

God's personality and manner of his recognition of us, but

the essential point about the divine personality and ours is "that both
have purposes for which they care, and each can hear the other's call."73

The reference to the many attempts in human history to fill out
the description of God brings us to a point of connection with the reflex action theor,y of mind..

There are not onl.1 concrete, particular

objects that present themselves to the mind and evoke a response; the
whole universe itself ttknocks on our mental door and asks to be let in,
4
and fixed and decided upon and activeq met ...7
Faiths, systems, phi-

71Ibid., P• 122.

-

72Ibid.

-·

73Ibid

74Ibid., P• 123.

-

losophies, scepticisms are all attempts by the mind to deal with this
universe.

But the function of all these conceptions of the universe

is to pass into the third stage, the stage of action.

They are the

middle stage, not the end, and no matter how splendid they seem in
themselves as conceptions, they have only one function, to define the
direction which our activity will take.
different definitions

or

In fact, if two apparently

reality 'WOuld have identical consequences,

they are actually identical definitiona.75
Furthermore, no view of the universe will be accepted as rational
and will satisfy the mind unless it satisfies all three departments of

the mind., not violating the essential mode of activit7 of a.n;y department,
or leaving any without a cha.nee to work.

Matei'ialism, tor example, with

its emphasis upon atoms, and agnosticism with its doubting, give a solution which is irrational to the third department; their conceptions

otter no proper object for our active powers. Thei8111 1 on the other hand,
presents "the most practically rational solution it is possible to conceive. "?6 It calls upon all the energies of our active nature.

"At a

single stroke, it changes the dead blank j ! of the world into a living

-

thou, with vhom the whole man may have dealings."??
Because of its ability to challenge man's practical nature, theism

ia taken as the norm for conceptions of the world.

"Infre.-theistic"

conceptions, such as materialism and agnosticism, are irrational because

75Ibid., 123-4•

-

76Ibid. 1 P• 127.
7llbid.
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they are inadequate stimuli to man's practical nature.

He will now

consider "ultra-theistic" conceptions, those that go beyond God.
One of the essential attributes of God mentioned earlier was that
he is "a personality lying outside our own and other than us,--a power
not ourselvea."78 What James means here b;y "ultra-theistic" views is
any attempt to go be7ond the ultimate duality or God and his believer,

and to transform it into some sort of identity.

-

Infra-theistic views

-

regard the world as an it, theism as a thou, while these other theories
try to make it part of!!..•

This should not be confused with the "oneness

with God" through self-surrender which characterizes the highest moments
of theistic consciousness.

This is a practical union with God in which

God and the person are still two.

The theist in this case does not

somehow lose his identity in God or in thought; he knows that he himself
"simply is, and needs God; and that behind this universe God simpi,. is
and will be forenr, and will in some WfX3 hear his call."79

He finds no

need tor continued contemplation on the nature of God, but can respond
to his God with a religious reaction.
James•s own choice is to join the theist in the conviction that
"to the end of time our power ot moral and volitional response to the
nature of things will be the deepest organ of coimmmication therewith we
shall ever possess."8o For James, our destiny lies in active cooperation with God's creation and his purposes, "not in a:rq chimerical

-

7Sibid., P• 134.
79Ibid.,

P• 135.

8oIbid.,
P• 141.

speculative conquest ot him, not in arr, theoretic drinking of him up."81

To serve this universe is our task, and the most any theory can do is

to bring us to that.
These tour essqs, therefore, provide us with Jamea•s approach to

belief in general and the religious eypothesis in particular.
process, his underlying view of the world comes through.

In the

He consciously

rejects a monistic view where evil is directly traced to God and must
somehow be explained as caused by a supposedly good God.
not

80

When God is

directly tied to evil, then there is more hope tor man to deal

with the indiYidual evils ot life.

He rejects determinism as well, be-

-

lieving that there is scope for man's activity in the universe; he is
not handed a finished product to which he has no contribution.

In the

area of knowledge he rejects scepticism and maintains that man can approach ever closer to truth.

But he believes in truth as an empiricist,

not an absolutist; we can know the truth, but we cannot know for certain

that we have reached some kind of absolute truth.

We test our lv'Potheses

by living, trusting that the evidence will tell us whether or not we are
approaching truth; but no bell will ring to assure us that we have
arrived.

His emphasis is on seeking truth, not merely avoiding errori

losing the truth through inactivity can be worse than sometimes being in

error. Finally, rationality involves much l'llOre than a theoretical approe.oh.

The "sentiment" of rationality means a nuency of mind that

cannot be attained by theoretical reason a.lone.

If the mind is to keep
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"flowing," a view presented to it must speak to a person's practica.l
and aesthetic nature, his "volitional" nature.

The whole man is in-

volved, and more than merely logical needs must be met.

The mind is in

fact a triadic structure, and perception and conception are for the
sake of action.
ABS-inst this background James can justify belief in the sense of
going beyond sensible and scientific evidence.

We do in fact go beyond

such evidence; even science does so, more than it seems willing to admit.

Some questions cannot be answered by science, such as moral questions

and those involving personal. relations.

There a.re times when it is neces-

sary to go beyond scientific evidence, times when not to decide is to 88.'1
no, and when the action called for is so important that the decision cannot await more evidence even if it would be forthcoming.

Then too there

are times when the outcome requires our personal contribution, and in
auch cases our belie! can help to make the proposition true.

FinallJ', we

need a view of the world beyond purely scientific facts to challenge our
innennost powers and to reply to our deepest needs; it is such a view that
will make life worth living and maintain the sentiment of rationality.
The religious hypothesis is

on~

such way of going beyond the evi-

dence, providing an unseen order that helps the seen order make sense by
giving meaning to our efforts.

The God of theism, the deepest power in

th_· universe and a personality who "hears our call," is the best possible
object for our mind, structured as it is, because he is the one who can
sustain as well as challenge our deepest powers and give meaning to our
efforts without causing us to be "swallowed up" in pure thought or
consciousness.

Whether or not God exists, belief in him is the b1pothesis
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best suited to our structure and our needs because it spoaks to our
moral and volitional powers, and it is through these powers that we
corarnunicate with our world in the deepest way.

Therefore, according to James, belief is reasonable, or in his
terminology, rRtional.

But much of the space in the essays was given

to belief' in general, and we would expect James to want to give more
particular attention to the religious hypothesis once belief' in
general is justified.

And, as concerned as he was about remaining

true to the experiences of the individual, it is only natural that he
would care::'ully study not just religious belief but individual re1igious experiences.

Granted that belief of some kind ia necessary,

this will ahed more light on the ability of the religious hypothesis
to call forth our belief and answer our deepest needs in a We::J' that is
rational.

CHAPTER III

THE RATIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

If a person accepts religious belief as reasonable, as James
did, this opens up a range of data that would otherwise not be revealed, the area of religious experiences.

As a philosopher opposed

to traditional rationalism, he wanted to defend the reasonableness
of experience and the need to take it seriously in all its richness
and complexity; but he was particularly interested in defending the
reasonableness of religious experience.

In

~

Varieties of Religious

Experience, the Gifford Lectures given at the University of Edinburgh,
Scotland, in 1901 and 1902, he approached the subject using the perspective of the psychologist, providing a descriptive survey of the
religious propensities of man.

But he remained a philosopher as

well, intent on determining the rationality of religious experience,
rationality in his sense of reasonableness.

This chapter will be an

attempt to pull together his criteria for judging the rationality of
religious experience, and an examination of his conclusions.
From the point of view of method, there can be two orders of
inquiry in any investigation.

The first considers the nature, con-

stitution, origin, and history of whatever is under investigation
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and issues in an existential proposition.

The second considers its

importance, meaning, or significance now that it is here. and the
investigation about it results in a proposition of value, or what
may be called a spiritual judgment.

The present discussion will

therefore involve two basic questions: what are the religious propensities of man, and what is their philosophic significance?

1

The study will not focus on the "second-hand religious life"
of ordinary believers who simply follow the conventional religious
observances that have been handed on to them by tradition. Rather,
it will be concerned with "the original experiences which were the
pattern-setters to all this mass of suggested feeling and imitated
conduct."

2

These experiences will be found in the "geniuses" of re-

ligious life, people for whom religion was much more than a dull
habit.

These are the religious leaders and founders for whom reli-

gion was intensely personal, men and women with a keen awareness of
God and a vision of their own mieaion in the world.

Like geniuses

in other areas, those in religion have often shown symptoms of
nervous instability.

Religious leaders even more perhaps than

other kinds of genius
have been creatures of exalted emotional sensibility,
•• _. often ••• have led a discordant inner life,
• • • had melancholy during a part of their career,
• • • been liable to obsessions and fixed ideas; and
frequently they have fallen into trances, heard voices,
1Williem James, The Varieties of Reli ious
erience (New
York: Mentor Books, New American Library, Inc., 19
, P• 22-23.
2

~., P•

24.
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seen visiona, and presented all sorts of pec~iarities
which are ordinarily classed as pathological.
A concrete study' cannot ignore these pathological aspects, even
though there is often the fear that explaining such connections with
religious experience will explain away the significance of the religioue experience itself. , This is not true; nor ie the charge that
religious experience arises simply from some organic condition in a
person.

As a matter of tact all of our states of mind are in some way

conditioned by our organic processes.

But to begin explaining away

the value of religious experience because of any connection with
pathological experiences or organic conditions is to blur two modes
of inquiry.

The value of a particular religious experience is deter-

mined by the effect it has on the person, the contribution it makes
to his life, not on the way in which the experience may have originated.

The origins of a person's religious experience are often

inaccessible to us, but we can see and evaluate the effects in the
way he lives his life.

4

This concern with the effects of religious experience in a
person's lite, the practical fruits of his religious belief, will
be central to our study in this chapter.

It will be one of the

criteria James uses in determining the rationality of religious
experience.

This interest in evaluating practical effects is

further developed later in James's theory ot pragmatism.

3Ibid. t p. 24.
4
~., P•

34.

In this
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sense

~

Varieties of Religious E:xperience is the foundation for

his Pragmatism.
And yet, while it is the effects of religious experience that
we evaluate, it is helpful to study the origins and accompanying
circumstances as well, even if this involves us in exaggerated and
sometimes pathological experience.

These exaggerated experiences

"play the part in mental anatomy which the scalpel and the microscope play in the anatomy of the body. 115 We can then see the experience out of its more usual surroundings and become familiar with a
wider range of its variations.

At the same time it is important to

see that religious phenomena are "special cases of kinds of human
experience of much wider scope." 6 Religious melancholy is still
melancholy, religious happiness is still happiness, and it helps
us to understand the distinctive significance of the religious
experiences by comparing them with other experiences of the same
general type.

But as important as this comparison is, the test

of value remains the same: by its fruits, not its roots.
Among the many different possible ways of approaching religion,
then, James has chosen personal religion in its "first-hand" experience, rather than the institutional religion which develops
later.

He takes religion to mean
the feelings, acts, and experiencee of individual men
in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves

5

~·• P•

6

35.

~·• P• ?fl.
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to stand ~relation to whatever they may consider
the divine.
In order to include systems of thought such as Buddhism

which do not actually assume a God, and yet call for e religious
response from their followers, the vord "divine" will be taken in
a wider sense to denote "any object that is godlike, whether it
be a concrete deity or not."8 But on the other hand if the term
"godlike" becomes too general and includes everything that men
have ever considered "gods," the study will lose its specifically
religious character.

A man's religion is indeed his total reaction

upon life, but it cannot be said that every total reaction upon
life is a religion.

''There are trifiing, sneering attitudes even

tovards the whole of life; and in some men these attitudes are final
and systematic."9 Regardless of the value of such "trifiing and
sneering" attitudes as ways of looking at life, it would be straining our ordinary understanding of the word to call them "religio·. s."
For moat men religion implies a serious state of mind which "says
'hush' to all vain chatter and smart wit," but is opposed as well
to the "heavy grumbling and complaint" which fails to see meaning
in the vorld's tragedy.
There must be something solemn, serious, and tender
about any attitude which we demoninate religious. If
glad, it must not grin or snicker; if sad, it must

7Ibid.,
P• 42.
8

9

Ibid., P• 44.

~··

P•

45.
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not scream or curse. So I propose -- arbitrarily
again, if you please -- to narrow our definition
once more by saying that ••• the divine shall mean
for us only such a primal reality as the individual
feels impelled to respond to sole~y and gravely,
and neither by a curse nor a jest.

A compar.iaon of religion with morality in general provides
another characteristic.

Both are concerned with the way we face

the universe, but morality often tends to simply accept the law
of the universe as if it were a yoke, wherea.s with religion the
response is much more enthusiastic.

And this added dimension of
11
emotion, James feels, is found nowhere but in religion.
We are
in fact dependent upon the universe, and this dependence will call
forth sacrifices and surrenders of some sort.

In "those states of

mind which fall short of religion, the surrender is submitted to
as an imposition of necessity, and the sacrifice is undergone at
12
the very best without compleint.n
In the religious lite, however,
"surrender and sacrifice are positively espoused." Religion then
makes easier an acceptance of the universe which is necessary anyway, and performs a !Unction "which no other portion of our nature
can so successfully fulfill. 01 3 That religion thus fulfills a

10Ib"d

-L·· P• 47.

11

Ibid., P• 54.

12Ibid.,
P• 56.
13Ibid.,
P• 56.

basic need in man is a conclusion, says James, to vhich ve 'Will be
led by the empirical investigation of religious experience.
The first form of religious experience ve will consider 'Will
be the "religion of healthy-mindedness."

Noting that happiness

is one of the chief concerns in life, James states that the ordinary
believer will often regard the happinesa which a religious belief
affords as a proof of its truth.

Whether to do so is correct or
not, it emphasizes the importance of happiness in a man's life. 14
For some people happiness seems to be congenital.

They see

God e.nd nature as good, can think no ill of man, and find it impossible to linger over the evils in the world.

They are "once-

born" rather than "tvice-born" in that they seem to need no deliverance from evil.

Emerson and \tlhi tman a.re examples of this "heal thy-

mindedness • • • vhich looks on all things and sees that they are
good."15
In addition to this involuntary healthy-mindedness by which
R

person immediately feels happy, there is e more voluntary and

systematic type.

As every abstract way of conceiving things telces

one aspect as the essence and temporarily disregards the others,
systematic healthy-mindedness talces good as the essential aspect
of being and deliberately excludes evil from its vision.

This is

not as intellectually dishonest as it may seem at first.

"Happiness,

14

Ibid., P• ?6.

15Ibid., P• 83.
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like every other emotional state, has blindness and insensibility
to opposing facts given it as its instinctive weapon for selfprotection against disturbance." 16 This deliberate adoption of an
optimistic attitude can then grow into a religious policy in a way
that is certainly not absurd.

This process answers a tendency we

all have to divert our attention trom evil as much as we can.
An especially interesting religious example of systematic
healthy-mindedness, according to James, is the "Mind-Cure movement."
Its doctrinal sources include the tour Gospels, New England transcendentalism, Berkeleyan idealism, Hinduism, spiritim, and evolutionism with an emphasis on progress.

Its characteristic feature

is "an intuitiTe belief in the all-saving power ot healthy-minded
attitudes" such as courage, hope, and trust, along with a contempt
for doubt, fear, and worry. 17 Thia belief haa been generally corroborated by the experience of those people who have found a healing
for their mind and body, and the spread of the. movement is due mainly
to these practical fruits.
could not be influenced

Whether or not there are people who

by~these

ideas, the large number who have-

been so influenced makes it worthy of consideration and respect.
The mind-cure movement shares the general basis of all religious experience, acknowledgment that man has a dual nature and is
connected with two spheres of thought.

16

1!!!!!•,

P• 83.

17Ibid., P• 88 •

But for the mind-cure the
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essential vice in the lover sphere is fear.

In the higher level,

the spiritual in man appears as ''partly conscious, but chiefiy
subconscious; and through the subconscious part of it we are already
one with the Divine without any miracle ot grace, or abrupt creation
of a new inner man." 18 While fear and all egoistic modes of thought
lead to destruction, the way to life is to come into a conscious
realization of our onenesa with the Divine and to open ourselves
fully to the flow of the Infinite IJ.fe through us.

To the degree

to which a person realizes his oneness with the Infinite Spirit,
to that extent he will exchange "disease for ease, inharmony for
harmony, suffering and pain for abounding health and strength." 19
James lists several accounts by people who have been restored to
health through this mind-cure doctrine.
The mind-cure movement is obviously optimistic.

Evil is empiri-

cally present for its followers as for anyone, but there is no speculative explanation of it; evil is something to be transcended and
forgotten, with attention focused on the regenerative power of optimistic thinking. 20
James then points out a psychological similarity between the
mind-cure movement and the Lutheran and Wesleyan movements.

All

begin with a man's realization that there is something wrong with him,
and his question about what he must .!!!?, to become well and whole, or

18

Ibid.' P• 92.

19Ibid.,
P• 92.
20

Ibid., P• 96-97.

r
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in religious terms, saved.

The answers too are similar.

Luther

and Wesley tell a perlSOn he is already saved if he would only believe
it; the mind-curers tell him he is already well and whole, if he
would only realize his real being.

And it is the adequ.-. :.y of the

mind-cure message to the mental needs of a large portion of mankind
that accounts for its spread. The same type of adequacy accounted
for the spread of the Lutheran and Wesleyan movementa. 21
James notes that the "official moralists" advise us never
to relax our efforts to change for the better, but rather to be
vigilant and to shrink from no effort.

But the Lutheran, Methodist,

and mind-cure movements seem to otter evidence tor the position that
there are many people for whom, at least at a certain stage in their
development, a change ot character tor the better comes about by
just the opposite of this advice, by a surrender, a relaxing, a
letting go, resigning oneself to higher powers.
salvation through

self-~~espair,

This is a kind of

a dying to be truly born.

James

concludes that "this is certainly one tundamental form of human
experience.

Some say that the capacity or incapacity for it is what
divides the religious from the merely moralistic character.n 22 At

any rate, mind-curers have shown that this form ot regeneration by
relaxing and letting go, ''psychologically indistinguishable from
the Lutheran justification by faith and the Wesleyan acceptance of

21

~·• P• 97•

22
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free grace, is within the reach of peraon.s who have no conviction
of sin and care nothing for the Illtheran theology.n 23 But the results
of this relaxation and abandonment of effort are facts of human nature,
no matter what theor;y we adopt for their ultimate explanation.
Furthermore, along with reaaoned advice, the founders of mindcure ::ave made great use of the subconscious life and have emphasized
"systematic exercise in passive relaxation, concentration, and medi24
tation," which does not seem to differ intrinsically from the
practice of "recollection" in Catholic discipline.

Both involve

an swarenesss of the presence of God and a oneness with God which
gives a peraon strength in the midst of his daily activities.
Science, of course, would not accept mind-cure's belief in
s higher power that vill talce care of us if we only throw ourselves
upon it.

And yet mind-cure uses science's own method of verifies-

tion; it invites a peraon to live as if its hypothesis were true
and to see whether or not his experience will verify it.

The growth

of the movement indicates that for many people experience does
verify it.

For them, at least, science cannot veto the mind-cure

movement.

From this James concludes that the universe is a "more

1118ny-sided affair than a:ny sect, even the scientific sect, allows
for." 25 The world can be handled according to many systems of ideas,

23Ibid.,
P• 99.
24

Ibid.' P• 102.

25Ibid.'
P• 107.

each providing some kind of profit while omitting some other.

Evi-

dently, then, science and religion
are both of them genuine keys for unlocking the world's
treasure-house to him who can use either of them practically.
Just as evidently neither2is exhaustive or exclusive of the
other's simultaneous use.

Science, therefore, cannot veto the mind-cure movement for those
for whom its practical fruits have been helpful, and in this sense
mind-cure is a rational religious view.

Furthermore, it speaks to

the common human desire for happiness and builds upon what seems to
be a fundamental form of human experience in its regeneration by relaxation and surrender to higher powers, an experience shared by the Lutheran
and Wesleyan movements, and shared as well in its method of meditation and recollection by Catholicism and by Eastern religions.

It is

this basis in shared experience, along with the practical fruits,
which provides the test of rationality for mind-cure, and healthymindedness in general, as a religious belief.
However, there are people who cannot so easily rid themselves
of the consciousness of evil.

For some, evil is merely a wrong cor-

respondence of their life and their environment, curable by changing
either of the two factors or both.

For others, evil is something more

radical, a wrongness in man's nature which no superficial rearranging
can cure, requiring rather a supernatural remedy.

In psychological

terms we can speak of the different "thresholds" of a person, with

26

Ibid., P• 107.
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some people living on the

11

aunny side" of their misery-threshold, while .

the depressed and melancholy live beyond theirs. 27
There is in fact evidence that all is not as optimistic as the
healthy-minded would have us believe.

The joys of this life are inse-

cure at best.
Unsuspectedly from the bottom of every fountain of pleasure,
as the old poet said, something bitter rises up: a touch of
nausea, a falling dead of the delight, a whiff of melancholy,
things that sound a knell, tor fugitive as they may be, they
bring a feeling of coming from a deeper region and often have
an appalling convincingness. The buzz of life ceases at their
touch as 8 piano-string stops sounding when the damper falls
upon it. 2
Even if a person has not experienced this precariousness in his
own life, seeing the misfortune of so many other people would force him
to recognize that his good fortune could easily be otherwise.

Our

solu-

tion must go deeper than actually escaping misfortune.
The fact that we can die, that we can be ill at all, is what
perplexes us. •• :-We need a life not correlated with death,
a health not liable to illness, a kind of good that will not
l·'erish, a good in fact that fiies beyond the Goods of nature. 29
This is why a view of life that does not give meaning beyond the
present moment will never satisfy.

If the present moment leads nowhere and

has no deeper meaning, no amount of ignoring or forgetting will hide its
hollowness.
We will see later the joy of "twice-born" people whose religion is

27~.,

P• 116-117.

28Ibid.,

P. 118.

29~.,

P• 121.

non-naturalistic.

But the securest way to the happiness they report has

been as a matter of fact through a radical pessimism that involves the
person in pathological melancholy.

After describing various kinds of

pathological depression, James cites examples of religious melancholy,
beginning with Tolstoy, vhose personal account describes how his life
gradually lost all its meaning and zest, and became dreary and joyless.
John .Bwlyan's melancholy, described next, resulted from his psychopathic
temperament and sensitive conscience, leading to doubts and fears about
the conditj.on.of his ovn personal self.

The third type of melancholy,

based on Jan1es's o.vn experience, takes the form of tear of the universe.
How a person can recover from such religious melancholy will be described
later, but the point here is to realize the radical pessimism experienced
by such ''morbid-minded" people and to see how far removed it is from

healthy-mindedness.

'l'o people suffering from such religious melancholy,

the attitude of healthy-mindedness seems shallow indeed.30
In attempting to compare the two viewpoints as an impartial ob-

server, James feels that morbid-mindedness "ranges over the wider scale
of experience.n31 The method of healthy-mindedness, to ignore evil
and live only in the light of good, does work for many people, and as
long as it does it is a valUB.ble viewpoint for them.
when faced with melancholy.

Furthermore, the evil facts which it

chooses to ignore are a genuine part of reality.

30ibid., P• 124-137.

31
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But it breaks down

It may be that there
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are some forms of evil which will never fit into a total view of the
universe and will be best handled by being ignored.

But in the meantime,

they are still there, and it would seem that a view which admits their
presence and deals with them would be a more adequate philosophic doctrine
than healthy•mindedness with its unwillingness to give them any attention.

32

'

We saw in the previous lecture the rationality that healthy-

mindedness does have as a religious belief.

We see now that it is limited

to certain people and certain conditions, and it breaks down when asked to
deal witJl melancholy and evil.

Here another kind of religion is needed,

a religion of deliverance.
James will now focus attention on the "twice-born," the person for
whom natural good is insufficient in itself and for whom evil is very
real, and who must therefore die to the natural to be reborn in the
spirit'lJal.

First will come a treatment of the general psychological

basis of the twice-born character.
This basis lies in "a certain discordancy or heterogeneity in the
native temperament of the subject, an incompletely unified moral and in··-.~·

tellectual conati tution. "~' · Some people seem to be born with their
impulses consistent with one another, but others in varying degrees find
much more of a confiict within them, echoing the words of St. Paul,
"What I would, that I do not; but what I hate, that I do." The normal
evolution of character then consists in the "straightening out and

32Ibid., P• 138-139.
33Ibid., P• 141.
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unifying of the inner self•••• The higher and the lower feelings,
the ueetul and the erring impulses, • • • must end by forming a stable
system of !unctions in right subordination. ,,34 This process of unification itself may come gradually or quickly.

"It may come through

altered feelings or through altered powers of action; or it may come
through new intellectual insights, or through experiences which we
shall later have to designate as 'mystical.'"35 However the unification
comes, it brings vi.th it a characteristic kind of relief and happiness.
It is important to notice that reaching this unification through
religion is only one way; the precess of unification is a basic human
process, and the religious types of regeneration are only one species
of a genus that includes other types as well.

The new birth may in

fact be away from religion and morality, and the unification may be
brought on by such diverse passions as "love, ambition, cupidity,
revenge, or patriotic devotion."36
When this process of, the unification of the self is seen in reli-

gious terms, we have the experience of conversion.

To understand the

psychological elements in this conversion process, it helps to notice
how a person's ideas, aims, and objects form different internal systems
relatively independent of each other.

As a particular aim becomes the

center of his attention, the ideas and objects connected vi.th another

34Ibid., P• 143.
35Ibid., P• 146.
36

ill!·' P• 147.
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aim fade into the background.

When the President of the United States,

for example, is away on a fishing trip, his aim and the system of ideas
related to it is much different from the aim and ideas when he is tunetioning as President.

Often in an ordinary

focus of interest to another.

ds.y

we pass from one aim and

But even in a deeper and more basic way a

person's interest may shift periodically from one aim to another and
leave him with the experience of being a "divided self." The same feeling of being divided may result when one aim .is actually responsible for
his activities, but there are other aims present to him on the outskirts
of his mind as ''pious wishes" or "fleeting aspirations. n37
As our lives go on, then, our aims and interests shift, and, perhaps, even change.

''Things hot and vital to us to-day are cold to-morrow, n.38

often leaving us with the feeling of being a wavering and divided self.
When the "focus of excitement and heat, the point of view from which the
aim is taken, • • • /;_Come to li!i'J permanently within a certain system,
• • • if the change be a religious one, we call it a conversion, especi-

ally if it be by crisis, or sudden."39

If we refer to the "hot place"

in man's consciousness, the group of ideas to which he is devoted and
from which he works, as the ''habitual centre of his personal energy,"
the conversion means that religious ideas which previously were peripheral
in his consciousness now take a central place and become the habitual
center of his personal energy.

37

~··
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Precisely how or why this shift takes place is hard to say, often
~en for the person experiencing it.

It seems that at times a new per-

ception or a sudden emotional shock will create a new "centre of gravity"
in a person and the structure will remain permanent, the person having
then "found tlimself" or gotten himself "together."
James then refers to Professor Starbuck's conclusion that the conversion process in young people brought up in evangelical circles is parallel to "that growth into a larger spiritual life which is a normal
.

phase of adolescence in every els.as of human beings."

~

The parallels

in age, symptoms, and results bring one to the conclusion that conversion
"is'in its essence a normal adolescent phenomenon, incidental to the
passage from the child's small universe to the wider intellectual and
spiritual life of maturity." 41 Even adult conversions :follow a similar
passage through a sense of incompleteness and anxiety to the relief of
a different and usually wider view.
Conversions will have different characteristics depending upon the
individual.

Some may involve mainly a change of behavior with little

intellectual readjustment or theology.

Others may have been precipi-

tated by the meaninglessness of life and will involve more of an intellectual character.

Furthermore, not everyone is open to conversion; for

various reasons, religious ideas do not become for some people the center
of their personal energy, although even this condition can change. 42

~

164.
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In fUrther describing the conversion process, James refers to the

common human experience of trying to remember a name.

The first ap-

pros.ch is definitely to try, working at it with a conscious effort.

But

sometimes this fails, and the harder we try the less hope there seems to
be, "as though the name were jammed, and pressure in its direction only
4
kept it all the more from rising." 3 But often if we give up trying
to remember and think of something else, soon "the lost name comes sauntering into your mind, as Emerson says, as carelessly as if it bad never
44
been invited."
The previous effort had started some kind of hidden
process which continued after the effort ceased.
This difference between the conscious and voluntary and the unconscious and involuntary way in which mental results are accomplished also
gives us two types of conversion.

In the voluntary type the change is

usually a gradual building up of a new set of moral and spiritual habits,
although even here there seem to be critical points where the movement
forward is more rapid.

"Our education in any practical accomplishment

proceeds apparently by jerks and starts, just as the growth of our
physical bodies does. 04.5
The more interesting type of conversion, though not radically different from the voluntary, is the involuntary or "self-surrender" type.
In fact, even in the most voluntarily built-up regeneration there are
stages when self-surrender is required; and in most cases the final step

43Ibid.,
P• 168.
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which brings a person to unification is one of self-surrender, not
activity. 46
James again refers to Dr. Starbuck in explaining why self-surrender
seems indispensable as the final stage in conversion.

A person moving

toward conversion has two things in mind; first of all, and most of all,
he is conscious of his

OYn

trying to moTe away from.

wrongness or incompleteness, the "sin" he is
Secondly, there is also some sort of positive

ideal he hopes to reach, but this is much less clear to him than the
very real feelings of incompleteness he is passing through.

Meanwhile

''his conscious straining& are letting loose subconscious allies behind
the scenes, which in their way work toward rearrangement."47 But this
rearrangement toward which these deeper forces is moTing is probably
quite different from what he consciously conceives.

As a result, the

final conversion may be interfered with by his voluntary efforts being
off the maifk, just as the word we try to remember seema "jammed" by
our efforts to remember it.

"When the new centre of personal energy

has been subconsciously incubated so long as to be just ready to open
into nower, 'hands off' is the only word for us, it must burst forth
unaided!" 48
The self-surrender in the conversion process often talces the form
of temporary apathy or exhaustion with the struggle, so that the person
simply seems to give up and no longer care.

46

P• 170.
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r

of self-surrender needed for the breakthrough to come.
James here points out the.t psychology and religion are in agreement up to this point, "that there are forces seemingly outside of the
conscious individual that bring redemption to his life."49 Psychology
refers to these as "subconscious" and not tre.nscending the individual's
personality, whereas Christian theology insists they are direct supernatural operations of God.

He will return to' the differences later, but

it is important to notice the agreement at this point.
Next James moves on to cases of instantaneous conversio~ the more
dr8Dl8.tic type of conversion which seems to be so closely connected with
divine grace.

The more usual Protestant sects and the Catholic Church

generally set lji,ttle store by such conversions for ordinary believers,
but Methodism and certein other groups take them as essential signs that
salvation has been effectively received.

Jar::es then raises the question,

"Is an instantaneous conversion a miracle in which God is present as he
is present in no change of heart less strikingly abrupt?".50 He asks too
whether those who experience instantaneous conversion are the only ones
who really partake of Christ's nature whlle others merely seem to.
James approaches the question psychologically, beginning with the
concept of "field of consciousness." He points out the growing realization that the unit of mental life is not the single, definitely outlined
"idea," but more probably the total mental state, "the entire wave of
consciousness or f'ield of objects present to the thought at a:n.y time,"

49
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which is impossible to outline with any definiteness.

"As our mental

fields succeed one another, each has its centre of interest, around
which the objects of which we are less and less attentively conscious
fade to a margin so faint that its limits are unassignable."5 1 The
width of these fields will vary among individuals, and within the same
individual at different times.

Great organizing geniuses have broader

fields of vision, for e:.eample; the ordinary person at times of illness
or fatigue may find his field narrowed to a point where he feels oppressed
and contracted.
margin.

But the important point is the indetermination of the

"Our whole past store of memories noats beyond this margin,

ready at a touch to come in; and the entire mass of residual powers,
impulses, and knowledges that constitute our empirical self stretches
continuously beyond it."52·
This brings us to the notion of subliminal or extra-marginal conaciousness.
The most important consequence of having a strongly developed
ultra-marginal life of this sort is that one's ordinary fields
of consciousness are liable to incursions from it of which
the subject does not guess the source, and which, therefore,
talce for him the form of unaccountable impulses to act, or
inhibitiona ot action, of o~~essive ideas, or even of hallucinations of sight or hearing • .James feels therefore that whenever we see such phenomena, we should
first of all try to determine whether "it be not an explosion, into the
fields of ordinary consciousness, of ideas elaborated outside of those

51ill!!· t P• 187.
52Ibid. t

P• 187.

53Ibid.,
P• 189.
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fields in subliminal regions of the mind. 0 5

In applying this to instantaneous conversions, James abstracts :from
v

the question of their value :for the spiritual life o:f' the individual and
considers only their psychological side.

From this point of view he

sees so many similarities between conversions and what is found outside
of conversions that he suspects the difference between a sudden and a
gradual convert to lie not in the presence of a miracle in the one and
something less divine in the other, but rather in a simple psychological
peculiarity,
namely, that in the recipient of the more instantaneous grace
we have one of those Subjects who are in possession of a
large region in which mental work can go on subliminally, and
from which invasive experiences, abruptly upset5~ng the equilibrium of the primary consciousness, ma;y come.
Seeing instantaneous conversion as a result of such an invasive
experience from the subliminal region r8ther than as a miracle should not
be objectionable, James maintains, even to people who feel such conversiona to be essential.

He reminds us again of the need to judge events

or conditions not by their origin but by the empirical standard of their
fruits for life.
If the fruits 12:£. !i.!! of the state of conversion are good,
we ought to idealize and venerate it, even though it be a
piece of natural psychology; if not, we ought to make short
work with i~ no matter what supernatural being may have
infUaed it.
A study of these fruits does not indicate that a suddenly converted

54Ibid.,
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man is radically different in nature from any other man.

There is no

distinctive radiance that would indicate that there are two objective
classes of human beings separated by a chasm.

The real fruit of conver-

sion lies in the momentousness of the fact for the individual himself and
the spiritual excellence in terms of love of God end man which it leads
to in his life.

But that excellence can also be found in gradual con-

verts end people who have passed through no crisis; it is not distinctive
only of sudden conversion.

Furthermore, Starbuck's studies have shown

conversion to be a ;3tage in ordinary spiritual growth, and Professor
George Goe has discovered some evidence at least "that sudden conversion
is connected vith, the possession of an active-subliminal self."57 But
again, recognizing this psychological basis for conversion does not
diminish its significance; its value is determined not by its origin but
by what it accomplishes in a person's life.

And conversion does seem to

bring a person to a new level of spiritual vitality, so· that he

!! born

anew.
James feels, therefore, that a developed subliminal self is necesssry for instantaneous conversion.

But he points out that this does not

necessarily exclude eome kind of direct presence of the deity.

It is

possible that if there are higher spiritual agencies that touch us directly, it may be through our subconscious region that they do so.

''The

hubbub of the waking life might close a door which in the dreamy Subliminal might remain ajar or open."58 The perception of some kind of

57 Ibid. t p. 193.

58Ibid., P• 195.
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external control which is an essential feature of conversion might be
just that, with the extern:il. control

~1orking

through our subconscious.

But again, the mere fact of tha control being external is not the eaeential point; it could be external and still be either diabolical or
divine.

The test of value is in the effects.

He will return to this

question of the higher power.
James then describes, again from personal accounts, the feelings
which fill the time of the conversion experience.

First is the sense of

a higher control, that the conversion is not dependent upon one's own
efforts.

There is as well an affective experience of assurance that all

is well, characterized by peace,

harmo~,

and

a willingness to be.

This

assurance and loas of vorey seems to enable the parson to perceive truths
he had. not known before, and to see a newness and beauty in the world he had

not seen previously.

The

conversion experience may also involve uncon-

aciousneaa, convulsions, visions, and involuntary utterances, but these
do not seem to have aJl1 essential spiritual significance or lead to
greater fruits for life.

But most charaoteriatio of the conversion pro-

oeLJs is the ecstasy of happiness produced in the convert.59
Regarding the transiency or permanence of such abrupt conversions,
James f eela the essential point is not the duration but the fact that it
shows a person the "high-water mark" of his spiritual capacity.

As a

matter of fact, while there are cases of backsliding, the cases of in·
stantaneoua conversion studied indicate a changed attitude toward life

59Ibid., 19.5-203.
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vhich is generally constant and permanent, with some fiuctuation in
ardor. 60
The process ot conversion, therefore, has a psychological basis

and is a particular type of the general process of unification of the
divided self.

Even instantaneous conversion, the type that vould seem

to have such a direct relation to the divine, has a p87Chological
basis in the subliminal or subconscious region.

This p87chological

basis is part of the rationality of the religious experience of conversion.

It is a shared human experience the mind can "flow with" and

"feel at home with," that does not jar the mind as unreasonable.

And

yet it does not destroy the value of the experience as religious.

The

presence of a higher pover is not ruled out; such a power may indeed
touch our lives through the subliminal or subconscious region.

But

the real test of conversion as a human as well as a religious experience
is again its "fruits not its roots."
Before beginning a description of the fruits of religious life and
an evaluation of them, James offers a psychological explanation for the

differences in character among human beings.

The diversity lies

"chiefiy in our differi§ susceptibilities .2!._ emotional excitement, and
in the different impulses .!!2, inhibitions vhich these bring in their

train."61

OUr moral and practical attitude at any given time is alw111s

a resultant of two sets of forces within us, impulses pushing us one

way and inhibitions holding us back.

Inhibitions can be strong deterents,

but if a strong enough emotional excitement takes hold they crumble.
60Ibid., 20,5-6.
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Thia is what happens in a person who either gradually or suddenly begins
to live in hia religious center of personal energy and is actuated by
spiritual enthusiasms.

Inhibitions which once held him back no longer

do 9 and his life after conversion takes on distinctively different
characteristics.
''The collective name for the ripe fruits or religion in a character ia Saintliness."62 There are certain features of saintliness which
are universal, James sliY's, the same in all religions.

Saintliness in-

Tolves, first of all, the "feeling of being in a wider life than that
of this world's selfish little interests; and a conviction, not merely
intellectual, but as it were sensible, of the existence of an Ideal
Power."

Secondly, saintliness is characterized by a "sense of the

friend~

continuity of the ideal power with our ovn life, and a willing

self-surrender to its control." Thirdly, an elation and freedom result,
"a.a the outlines of the confining selfhood melt down."

And fourthly,

there is a shift of the emotional center towards loving and harmonious
affections.
consequences:

These characteristics of saintliness have several practical
asceticism, to the point where self-surrender may become

self-immolation; strength ot soul, whereby the eense of enlargement of
life OTercomes inhibitions and fears and new levels of patience and tortitude are reached; purity, or the cleansing from life of sensual elements and a.D1thing that would cause spiritual discord; and charity, an
increase of tenderness tor fellow creatures resulting from the shift of

the person's emotional oenter. 63
In commenting further on charit1 and brotherly love, James remarks

that this brotherhood ot man would seem to follow logically from theism's
conception of the fatherhood of God, but in fact it does not derive
solelf from theism.

It is present in .Stoicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism,

and seems to be a characteristic affection to which our nature;is

liable.

Its basis in human eXperience would seem to stem from the tact

that joy, which is so much a part of the conversion experience, is an
expansive affection, "and all expansiYe affections are self-forgetful

64 Even brotherly love to the point

and kindly so long as they endure."

of loving one's enemies, as it is found in saintliness, is not self•
contradictor,.; it is "the extreme limit of a kind of magnanimity with
which, in the shape of pitying tolerance of our oppressors, we are
fairly tamiliar. 065 This important element of saintliness is not irrational• it has a basis in human experience, and if a level of emotion
could be reached where enmity would no longer inhibit the friendlier
interests in men, this "might conceivablf transform the world."66
James then gives examples and a further description of the transition f'rom tenseness and self-responsibility to peace and imperturbabilit1 which results f'rom the shift to a religious center of energy, noting
again that this is accomplished most often simply by relaxing.
63Ibid.,
P• 217.
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abelndonment of self-responsibility seems to be the fundamental act in
specifically religious 1 as distinguished from moral practice." Thia
seems to be a widespread and basic religious experience, "capable of
entering into closest marriage with every speculative creed. 1167

The purity of life characteristic of the saintly person refers to
his desire for the consistency that results when all his mind's objects
and occupations are ordered with reference to the spiritual excitement
which is now the center of his life.
inner discord or inconsistency.

Ile becomes very sensitive to arJ7

His desire for moral consistency and

purity may develop to such a degree that he finds the secular \tlOrld too
full of shocks and can unify his life only by withdrawing from this outer
world.
the

Just u

saint~

an artist achieves harmo111 by dropping out whatever jars,

person may avoid discord by a similar omission.

Monasteries,

with their "changeless order, characterized by omissions quite as much as
constituted of actions," mq provide a person with "that inner smoothness
and cleanness which it is torture to him to !eel violated at every turn
by the discordancy and brutality of secular existence."68

The next "symptom of saintliness" which James describes more fully

is aaoeticism, which he sqa is an activity that can originate on ditterent psychological levels.

Asceticism can be simply an expression of

"hardihood," a disgust with too much ease.

The temperance it involves

can be the reault of the love of purity described above which shuns anything sensual.

Asceticism can also be the result of love, a willingness

67 Ibid., P• 229.
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to make sacrifices because of the deity a person loves.

The mortifica-

tions and torments can likewise result from pessimistic feelings about
oneself, along with theological beliefs about expiation 1 so that the
person feels he is escaping worse sufferings hereafter by doing penance

now.

In its psychopathic form asceticism may be entered upon as a kind

of fixation or obsession, or, by a perversion of sensibility a person nl81
find plea.sure in what are normally pain-giving stimuli. 69
James refers then to the growing tendency in the Western world to
avoid pain, especially the self-inflicted mortifications that were carried to such extremes in the past.

Against this changing background

"any deliberate tendency to pursue the hard and painful as such and for

their ow sakes might well strike one as purely abnormal."70
it is really only the extreme which is abnormal.

And yet

Some people need a

certain amount of austerity and discipline to add zest to their lives,
or else living becomes too easy.

Therefore, asceticism in itself is

not abnormal.
James next offers a further description of poverty, one of the
11

ecclesiastioally consecrated'' ways of self-mortification.

Here too

there seems to be a paradox, as the instinct of ownership is a fundamental part of man's nature, and yet a re l'.lilCiation of ownership has

been an important part of saintliness in Christianity aa well as Hinduism, Buddhism, and other religions.

The rational basis for poverty

lies first of all in the long-standing distinction between men who

73

.!!!!!. and men who !E!.•71 There has long been an awareness that an accumulation of material goods can weigh a person down, and if his life is
based on having, he is less free than he would be if the emphasis were
on doing or being.
11

Poverty in its religious form moves beyond this

athletic attitude" to something related to the fundamental myster,' of

religious experience, "the satisfaction found in absolute surrender to
the larger power."72. Reliance on material goods seems to limit that
surrender, and so as a person enters a new center of personal ener@:1 and
submits to a higher power, a disinterest in material goods often follows
as a sign that the higher power is trnl.1 the center of interest. Poverty
can also stem partly from a desire for the equality of all God• a
creatures, a lack of interest in dignities, honors, or goods which would
set a person above his fellow man.73
In the next section James will attempt to judge the value of the
saintliness he has described, to see if the fruits of religion can help
us determine its value for human lite.

It will be, to parody Kant, a

"Critique of Pure Saintliness."
The approach again will be empirical, not "descending upon our
subject f'rom above" with fixed definitions and dogmas, but considering
the actual fruits of saintliness without a:trf special .! priori theological system, and asking whether on the whole religion is approved by its
fruits.

In forming this judgment, "our general philosophic prejudices,

71Ibid., P• 249.
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our instincts, and our comon sense will be our only guides."74
To a person who would object to this empirical approach, James
replies that history shows this in fact to have been how religions and
deities changed.

As man's insight into nature and social arrangements

developed, particular characteristics of his deity also changed.

Today

a God who would require human sacrifices is unacceptable, while at
' another time such ferocity and power in a deity were respected.

1

Histor-

ical circumstances certainly play a part in this, but man's needs also
are a contributing factor.

In a very real sense,

men have chosen their

gods because of the fruits their belief has yielded, the practical implications of the definition or their deity.
So soon aa the fruits began to seem quite worthless; so soon
as they conflicted with indispensable human ideals, or
thwarted too extensively other values; so soon as they appeared childish, contemptible, or immoral when reflected
upon, the deit¥ grew discredited, and was erelong neglected
and torgotten. 5

In this way various religions have approved themselves, ministering to
certain vital needs in man.

"When they violated other needs too strongly,

or when other taiths came which served the same needs better, the first
religions were aupplanted.."76
James•s purpose here will be to "test saintliness by common sense,
to use human standards to help us decide how tar the religious life com-

74Ibid., P•
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mends itself as an ideal kind of human activity."77 This means considering
the practical effects of religious living to determine the rationality of
religious experience.

Aa

he had made clear at the beginning, his concern

is genuine, first-hand religious eXperience, not religion in its inatitutional form.

Through the course of history, much evil has been done in

the name of religion, but first-hand religious experience cannot be blamed
for the behavior of members ot particular religious groups or institutions.)'
But one charge religious experience would seem liable to is overzealousness, or fanaticism.

In any area, we admire a genius !or his

vision or hie contribution, realizing that his extreme view leaves out
other views; we admire him without trying to imitate hie extremism.
Saintliness will have its examples of such extrend.sm too.

But "excess,

in human faculties, means usually one-sidedness or want of balance; for

it is hard to imagine an essential faculty too strong, if only other
faculties equally strong be there to

co~perate with it in action...?8

Strong faculties are no problem if they are balanced; they then result in
a strong character.
In the life of saints, technicalJ~ so called, the spiritual
faculties are strong, but what gives the impression of
extravagance proves usually on examination to be a relative
deficiency of intellect. Spiritual excitement takes pathological forms wheneve79other interests are too tew and the
intellect too narrow.

To avoid fanaticism, both elements must be present--a sufficiently wide
range of interests and an adequate intellect.

71 Ibid.,
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The devout love of God, one of the basic fruits of saintliness,
when unbalanced becomes fanaticism, which is only "loyalty carried to
a convulsive extreme." The deficiency of intellect creates an imbalance with the loyalty.

"When an interusely loyal and narrow mind is

once grasped by the feeling that a certain superhuman person is worthy
of its exclusive devotion, one of the first things that happerus is that
it idealizes the devotion its"'lf."

Bo The wrshipper'a attention is

focused on adequately realizing the merits of the deity, who cannot be
praised enough.

This leads to a jealouay for the deity's honor,

strong enough at times in history to launch crusades and massacres,
and leading at other times at least to intolerance and persecution.

A

greater degree of intellect with the devotion would enable the person
to see that he is serving, and creating, a despotic kind of God mindful
only of his own glory.

The

God it reveals and the narrowness it betrays

rule out this fanaticism as a worthwhile fruit of the religious life.
Such fanaticism exists only in an aggressive person.

In gentle

characters when devotion is intense and the intellect feeble, the mind
is too narrow for more than one kind of affection.

"When the love of

God takes possession of such a mind, it expels all human loves and human
uses."81 This, James maintains, is innocent enough, but the exclusion
of all practical human interests is again too one-sided to be reasonable.
James coins the term "theop;':.thic" to describe this excess of devotion.
The one difficulty with this kind of devotion, as James's examples indi8oibid.
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cate, is that the person is so taken up with ecstasy for God that he is
of little or no use to his neighbor, which in Christianity at least is a
definite imbalance.

Furthermore, people of this type who write of their

experiences of God and his love for them reveal a God who could hardly
be generally believed in.

"Smitten as we are with the vision of social

righteousness, a God indifferent to everything but adulation, and full
of partiality for his individual favorites, lacks an essential element
of largeness."82 Again, a lack of intellect creates an imbalance and
keeps the devotion from being rational in James's sense.
Purity is the next saintly virtue subject to excess.

When sensi-

tivity and narrowness occur together, they require a pure and simplified
world to live in.

An aggressive person in this situation will find order

and purity by forcibly stamping out disorder and divergence.

A more re-

tiring person will leave the disorder in the world at large and find his
ovn order end purity b,- creating a smaller world.

This may lead to drop-

ping one external relation after another as interfering with his spiritual consciousness, beginning with amusements, conventional society,
business, and even family.

As noted earlier, this simplicity can be

found by leaving the world and entering a monastery.

The uniformity

found in some communities, monastic and other types, which includes
stereotyped costume, hours, and habits, can create the kind of simplicity and purity 'Which some people find e need for. 83
Thia desire for purity end simplicity can be carried to an excess,

82
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however, as the lives of some saints testify.

But our final judgment in

this area will depend on the idea of God we have and the kind of conduct
we feel he is pleased with.

For example, in the Catholicism of the six-

teenth century it was acceptable to "leave the world to the devil whilst
saving one's own soul." Today there is more of an emphasis on helping
to create a better world, "and to be of some public or private use is
also reckoned as a species of divine service." Purity and simplicit7 of
life are therefore not the only values, "and it is better that a life
should contract many a dirt-mark, than forfeit usefulness in its efforts
to remain unspotted.••84

Tiie difficulty with tenderness

and charity, the next fruits of re-

ligion to be considered, is that they often seem un.ealistic and out of
place to the man of the world.

Perhaps in a more perfect environment,

where everyone was a saint, it might be practical to live these virtues,
but in the real world "Resist not evil" and "Love your enemies" can too
easily be taken advantage of.
The whole modern scientific organization of charity is a
consequence of the failure of simply giving alms. The
whole history of constitutional government is a commentar,
on the excellence of resisting evil, and when one cheek
is smitten, ~r smiting back and not turning the other
cheek also. 8
And yet the issue is not that simple.

There is a real need for

the charity and tenderness of' the saint, with his willingness to help a
brother first and then find out if' he is wortb1 1 his readiness to trust

84Ibid., P• 275.
85Ibid., P• 276.
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and be duped many times rather than always to be suspicious.

The charity

of the saint is often prophetic, pointing to a time to come when such
concern will hopefully be more widespread.

It ia likewise a real crea-

tive force, often stimulating people to become
~reating

them with respect.

wort~

ot respect by

"One fire kindles another; and without that

over-trust in human worth which they show, the rest of us would lie in
spiritual stagnancy. u86 Force can destroy enemies, but by risking the
first step through charity and non-resistance, the saint can sometimes
change enemies to friends.

Even what seems at times to be an excess of

charity and tenderness can be a positive contribution to our world.
It is not difficult to see how asceticism, the next fruit of the
religious life, can lead to pathological excesses.
to consider the

good

But it is important

intention of asceticism rather than the uselessness

o! some of ita acts.
For in its spiritual meaning asceticism stands for nothing
less than for the essence of the twice-born philosophy. It
symbolizes • • • the belief that there is an element of real
wrongness in this world, which is neither to be ignored nor
evaded, but which must be squarely met and overcome by an
appeal to the soul's heroic ?8sources, and neutralized and
cleansed away by suffering. 8
This much asceticism every man needs, to answer the challenge to heroism
involved in facing and overcoming the evil in his lite.
We have seen, therefore, that the fruits of religion, the charaeteristics of saintliness, can lead to excesses, sometimes harmful ones.
A person must have a sufficiently wide range

86
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intellect must be able to work with the spiritual energy to maintain a
balance.

In all !airness it

particul~

mus~

be noted too that the narrowness in

cases often has to do w;th the historical circumstances and

the accepted ways or eXpressing spiritual energy.

But on the whole, the

•'.!Xrunination ot religion by practical common sense and the empirical
method leaves it "in possession of its towering place in history.
Economically, the

s~intly

world's welfare."88

group of qualities is indispensable to the

We have seen earlier how a conversion to a religious

center of energy can broaden a person's vision, challenge his powers, and
bring him a deep peace and joy.

These practical fruits for the

pe~son

himself, coupled with the contributions of a genuine religious life to
the world of man, form a rational basis for the religious hypothesis aa
it is lived with varying degrees of saintliness.
James's approach in all of this has been empirical; if the fruits
of religion are good, to that extent the religious hypothesis is
and true.

r~tional

But he realizes that many people would prefer to approach the

question from the other direction, first establishing the objective truth

of the religious

~othesis,

not just its utility.

If the God of reli-

gion really exists, then the things men do to meet his demands find their
rational basis in the fact that God exists and makes these demands.

In

an attempt to address this question of the truth of religion, James will

now consider mysticism, since this is a religious experience in which
some people have claimed to see truth in a special way.

He will later

determine what religious philosophy can add to the truth of the reli-
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gious }\,vpothesis.
Since "mysticism" and "mystical states of consciousness" are, like
"religion," terms that can take on many meanings, James proposes four
characteristics which will be present in an experience which he would
-·:all mystical.

The first mark is ineffability.

A person who has had a

mystical experience cannot adequately describe it in words; it must be
experienced to be appreciated.

And yet, though mystical states are

similar to states of feeling, they also have a noetic quality.
They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed
bJ the discursive intellect. They are illuminations,
revelations, full of significance and importance, all
inarticulate though they remain; and as a rule they 08§17
with them a curious sense of authority for aftertime.
Thirdly, mystical states are generally marked by trrlllaiency, lasting
often only half an hour or so.
such as fixing the

~ttention

Finally, although preliminary operations

or going through certain bodily performances

may facilitate the approach of the mystical state, the characteristic
state of consciousnees itself, once it sets in, is marked by passivity.
The person feels "as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a superior power."90
James then gives several personal accounts of mystical experience
and its methodic cultivation in certain religions.

But he approaches it

"in aeries," beginning \tiith phenomena which aro part of ordinary human
experience ann are the rudiments of mystical experience in its religious
forms. ''The simplest rudiment of mystical experience would seem to be

89 Ibid., P• 293,.
90Ibid ..
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that deepened sense ot the significance of a maxim or tormula which occasionally sweeps over one.n91

It is the experience of words, state-

ments, or even sights, sounds, or smells which we are very familiar
with, suddenly taking on deeper meaning.

"A more pronounced step for-

ward on the mystical ladder is found in an extremely frequent phenomenon, that sudden feeling, namely, which sometimes sweeps over us, ot
having 'been here before,• as if at some indefinite past time, in just
this place, with just these people, w were already saying just these
things. u92 Then too there are those momenta, perhaps when walking outdoors, when everything seems to have a meaning even though it cannot be
put into words.

The rudiment of mysticism in theae experiences would

seem to be the sudden awareness that "sweeps over" a person, an awareness quite different from any purely intellectual insight.
Moving further along in the series, James says:
The next step into &11'Btical states carries us into • • • the
consciousness produced by intoxicants and anaesthetics.
especiall7 by alcohol. The sway of alcohol over mankind is
unquestionably due to its power to stimulate the mystical
faculties of human nature, usually crushed to ell§~b. by the
cold facts and dry criticisms of the sober hour.
These various human experiences are in a sense the rational basis
tor mysticism; they are types of consciousness of which mysticism is a
particular religious variety.

James concludes the description with

several examples of religi$us mysticism and its cultivation.
91 Ibid.,

P•

92Ibid ••

P• 295.

9

294.

'Ibid., P• 297.

The goal in this section was to determine the contribution mysticism could make toward the objective truth of the religious hypothesis,
and James surmnarizes his findings in this area.

"Myatical states, when

well developed, usually are, and have the right to be, absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come."94 The mystic feels that
he has had a direct experience of truth, and this becomes a force that he
can live by.

This goes beyond strictly logical reasoning, and the vision

that the mystic has had is certainly not something that someone else can
argue him out of.
James•s second conclusion is that no authority emanates from mystical states "which should mske it a duty for those who stand outside of
them to accept their revelations uncritically. 1195 The enlargement,
union, and emailcipation characteristic of mysticism can fit with several
different world views, and so the mystic cannot expect the particular
world view tied to his mystical experience to be accepted uncritically
by those who have not shared that experience.

In fact, there can also

be a "diabolical mysticism," a sort of religious mysticism "turned upside down," with many similarities to religious mysticism but moving
toward pessimism and destruction.

"It is evident that from the point of

view of their psychological mechanism, the classic mysticism and these
lower mysticisms spring from the same mental level, from that great
subliminal or transmarginal region of which science is beginning to admit the existence, but of which so little is really know."9 6 The

94Ibid. t

P• 323.

95Ibid.,

P• 324.

96 Ibid.,

P• 326.
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revelations of mystioi81Jl cannot be accepted uncritically, therefore; they
must be tested by empirical methods.

Finally, James concludes that mystical states
break down the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic
consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses
alone. They show it to be only one kind of consciousness.
They open out the possibility of other orders ot truth, in
which, so tar as ~hing in us viWly responds to them, we
~ freely continue to have taith.
Mystical states are "excitements like the emotions of love or ambition" by which tacts already objectively before us ''make a new connection with our active life.

They do not contradict these tacts as such,

or deey anything that our senaes have immediately eeized."98 Mystical
states give a person a vision that goes beyond the partial view rendered
by the tacts ot sense and understanding alone, and give him the excite-

ment needed to live according to that view, all without violating the
tacts presented by sense and understanding.
This study ot myatici81Jl has provided an indication of its basis in
ordinary human experience and the need tor evaluating its fruits and revelations

empirical~.

But the person looking for the objective truth of

religion and the existence of its God Wlltuld still be unsatisfied.

Mys-

ticism does not speak with that kind of authorit7 to people outside of
it.

At best, the higher 111stical states

point in directions to which the religious sentiments even
ot non-mystical men incline. They tell of the supremacy ot
the ideal, of vastness, of union, of safety, and of rest.

97Ibid. 1 P• 324.

98

-

Ibid., P• '32!'1·

They offer us p;ypotheses, hypotheses which we may voluntarily
ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot possibly upset • • • •
It may be that possibility and permission of this so199are all
that the religious consciousness requires to live on.

But lll8lJ1 people might still teel that it

God

exists, then there should

be something to compel belief, something that is closer to necessa?'J' truth

than merely possible hypothesis.

Philosop~

bas often claimed to prove re-

ligious truth b1 coercive argument, and th:ts will be James's next area for
consideration.
Can philosophy indicate whether the sense or divine presence so

basic to religious experience is a sense

or

anything existing objectively?

JaJDes begins his answer by explaining his opinion that "feeling is the

deeper source ot religion, and that philosophic and theological formulas
are secondary products, l.ik.e translations of a text into another tongue."100
I! man had never felt inner unhappiness and a need of deliverance on the

one hand and 111stioal emotion on the other, all basic religious feelings,
his intellectual view of the universe probably would have led him to a better and better scientific explanation of reality, with no need to believe
in arI3' kind of deity or power beyond acience and his own abilities.

What

caJne first, therefore, was the basic feeling ot unhappiness and need of
deliverance, and the sense of a higher power in whom that deliverance
could be found; the speculative philosophical and theological formulas
were then "over-beliefs, buildings-out performed ey the intellect into

99Ibid. 1 P• 328.

-

100
Ibid., P• 329.
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directions ot which feeling originally supplied the hint."202
Again, some would perhaps vant the procedure reversed.

They would

like to have the existence of God proved by pure reason, in universal

terms that would logically compel the intellect, and would theretore
justify the religious feelings they have.

Dogmatic theology and philo-

sopJ:o' have at times pretended to do that, providing an ideal refuge for

"spirits vexed b7 the muddinesa and accidentality ot the world of sensible things.n182 But, James points out, theology baaed on pure reason
has not proven universally validt as a matter of historical fact it has

not compelled the intellects ot men and banished differences and sects.
And it will never be able to, according to James.

ot man operates
in this field of divinity exactl,y as it has al'W81'S operated
in love, or in patriotism, or in politics, or in any other
ot the wider affairs of life, in which our passions or our
1111atical intuitions fix our beliefs beforehand. It finds
arguments for our conviction, for indeed it baa to find
them. It amplifies and defines our faith, &;r-dignifies
it and lends it words and plausibtOjty. It hardly ever engenders it; it cannot now secure it.
·
I believe, in tact, that the logical reason

James does not discuss the rational arguments for the existence of
God in detail.

He feels that they are alrea<11 weakened by their inabil-

ity to convince people who do not already believe in God, as well as by
Kant's criticism, and in particular by the ef'f'ect of Darwinian ideas on
the argument from design. 1o4 He feels that philosophy is eq~ unable
101

Ibid., P• 3.30•

102
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-Ibid., P• 333•
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to define the attributes of God.

After summarizing these attributes

that systematic theology has deduced, James applies to them the principle
of pragmatism as elaborated by Charles Sanders Peirce.
pragmatism, beliefs are rules for action.

According to

"If there were eny part of a

thought that made no difference in the thought's practical consequences,
then that part would be no proper element of the thought's signif'icance. 11105
There are some attributes of God deduced by dogmatic theology, such as his
aseity and his lack of distinction between potentiality and actuality,
which call for no differences in ms.n's behavior, and have therefore no
practical consequences.

"For my own part, although I dislike to se.y

aught that may grate upon tender associations, I must frankly confess
that even though these attributes were faultlessly deduced, I cannot conceive of its being of the smallest consequence to us religiously that an.y
1o6
one of them should be true."
There are attributes of God that do have
consequences for man's behavior, but again it cannot be proved by reason
alone that a God with these attributes exists.

"In all sad sincerity I

think we must conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experiences is absolutely hopeless. 111 07
Philosophy therefore cannot provide a rational basis for religious
experience in the sense of universally valid logical proofs for the existence of the God of religion.
105Ibid. t P• 339.
1o6Ibid.'
P•

340.

107Ibid.' P•

346.

But it can contribute to the rationality
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of religious experience in another

va::f •

We are thinking beings, and our

religious and mystical experiences as well as our other experiences must
be translated into thought.

In particular, if we hope to exchange our

feelings and experiences with others, we must use general and abstract

verbal formulas.

As religious experience is thus put into words, philo-

aopb1 can help compare the different formulations and point out what is
local and accidental to each.

It can confront these religious construe-

tions with the results of natural science and help eliminate doctrines

that are scientifically absurd or incongruous.
Sitting out in this way unwortb1 formulations, she can
leave a residuum ot conceptions that at least are possible. With these she can deal as b;ypotheses, testing
them in all the manners, whether neSffOAve or positive,
b7 which hypotheses are ever tested.
Philosophy can perhaps point to a particular hypothesis which seems most
closely verified by experience and within that hypothesis help to distinguiah between "what is innocent over-belief and symbolism in the ex-

pression of it, and what is to be literally taken. 111 09 In doing this,
philosoph1 can act as a mediator between believers, pointing out what is

common and essential in religious beliefs.

But this philosophizing can

never be done in a vacuum, away from concrete lite and personal experience.

It must begin with and continually return to the religious ex-

perience which will alwa;y-s be larger and deeper than

an:s

verbal formula-

tione.
In returning now to the description of religious experience, James
1o8Ibid.

109Ibid., P•

'Jtn.

89

will conclude with a few more characteristic elements.

Against the back-

ground of the previous discussion of secondary intellectual formulations
of religious experience, he notes how a person's aesthetic life plays a
part in the way he chooses a religion with particular "over-beliefs."
Some people prefer intellectual simplicity and purity, while others choose
richness and imagery.

He cites the difference between the Catholicism and

Protestantism of his time as an example.

He admits in fact that in the

previous section he spoke "too contemptuously of the pragmatic useless11
ness of the f'amoua scholastic list of attributes of the deity."
For

°

some people these attributes may add verbal richness and elegance to their
religious view, even though the particular attributes may have no other
practical significance for their lives.
He moves now to three elements represented in most books on religion as essential:

sacrifice, confession, and prayer.

Sacrifice has

always been a part ot religion, from burnt offerings in primitive religions to offerings of the heart and renunciAtions of the inner self in
contemporary religions.

He has already spoken of the essential place and

rational basis of sacrifice as "symbolic of the sacrifices which life,
whenever it is taken strenuously, calls for." 111
James sees a psychological basis and need for confession as an
element of religion.
It is part of the general system of purgation and cleansing
which one feels one's self in need of, in order to be in
right relations to one's deity. For him who confesses,
11 0ibid., P•
111

348.

.!!?!!!•• P• 351.
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shams are over and realities have begun; he has exteriorized
his rottenness. It he has not actually got rid of it, he at
least no longer smears it over with a hiJpocritical '1l2w ot
virtue--he lives at least upon a basis of vera~ity.

The basic human experience, regardless of the various religious forms
confession may take, is that the shell of secrecy is opened, allowing
"the pent-in abscess to burst and gain relie:t.n11 3
The third essential characteristic of religion is prayer.

Science

would dismiss certain kinds of prayer of petition, for a change in the
weather, !or example.

But if prayer is taken in the wider sense as mean-

ing "every kind of inward communion or conversation with the power reoognized as divine, we can easily see that scientific criticism leaves it
untouched. 11114 Prayer in this sense of a conscious relation between
the person and the power upon whom he depends is essential to religion,
and is in fact what distinguishes religion from ethics or humanism.

It

does not require any set formulas, but this prayer is realized as some-

thing active and mutual.

There is a conviction that in prayer something

is actually taking place between the person and his God.

There have been

llUlD1 opinions on what is effected by pr81er, but the genuineness of religion is bound up with this belief that prayer is somehow effective.
"Through prayer• religion insists, things which cannot be realized in 8If1
other manner come about; energy which but for prayer would be bound is by
prayer set free and operates in some part, be it objective or subjective,
of the world of facts." 11 5

-·

112Ibid

113Ibid.

114
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The examples that James cites show that the forms and effects of
prayer have been viewed in various ways.

Some people pray asking God for

specific needs; for others, prayer is not tied as directly to particulars,
but arises from a more general awareness of their dependence upon God.
For some the effects of prayer are seen not so much in changing external
circumstances and events as in opening themselves to changes within, so
that as fear and egoism fall away through their conversation with God,
they see the world in a new light and can live with renewed energy.
meet a

~ew

world when we meet the old world in the spirit which this kind

of prayer infUses."
is that

"We

"sp~ritual

116

But the fUndamental point in all forms of prayer

energy, which otherwise would slumber, does become

active, and spiritual work of some kind is effected really.n 11 7
In drawing his conclusions based on this study of religious exper-

ience, James emphasizes again the importance of personal experience and
feeling in religion.

In the field of religion there is a great variety

of thought and theory-, but the basic feelings and actions are quite aimilar.

The theories are secondary explanations of the deeper and broader

experience of man.

And the faith of the religious person is a ''biolog-

ical as well as a psychological condition."

It is a force that men live

by and that sets loose in them energies that are creative and productive
for themselves and for the world.

From this subjective side alone re-

ligion is vindicated in a sense by the fruits it produces.

But in addition to considering the subjective utility of religion,
116

.!!?.!!!•,

11?

P• 3.59·
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James feels we should still try to determine its intellectual content and
ask whether or not this content is truet to see if this inquiry can add
anything to the rationality of religious experience.
With all the variations of theory and over-belief t there is a certain basic description of experience upon which all religions would
agree, involving first of all an uneasiness that man feels, a sense that
there is something wrong about him as he naturally stands, and secondly,
a solution to this uneasiness in that he can be saved from the wrongness

by making proper connection with higher powers.

The first step in this

experience is for the person to feel the wrongness and to be uneasy about
it; in this he has already begun to move beyond it.

"Along with the

wrong part there is thus a better part of him, even though it may be but
a most helpless germ.

With which part he should identify his real being

is by no means obvious at this stage." 118 But when the stage of solution
arrives, i.e., in religious terms when he achieves salvation, he chooses
to identify his real being with the higher part of himself, which still
may seem germinal.
He becomes conscious that this higher part {"of himselfJ is
conterminous and continuous with a MORE of the same quality,
which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which
he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on
board of and save himse~; when all his lower being has gone
to pieces in the wreck. 9
This general description includes the various experiences James had
mentioned and explained in detail:

118

Ibid., P•

383.

119

Ibid., P•

384.

the feeling of a divided self and the

93
consequent struggle; the change of the personal center ot energy; the
surrender of the lower self in a kind of letting Sol the feeling that
one is being helped by an external. power and united with it; and the
feelings of

~eourity

Regarding this

and joy- that result.
sUll!llary

of religious experience, James continues:

The part of the content concerning which the question of
truth most pertinenti,- arises is that 'MORE of the same
quality' with which our own higher self appears in the
experience to come into harmonious working relation. Is
such a •more• mere]J- our own notion, or does it realJ.3'
exist? If so, in what shape does it exist? Does it act,
as well as exist? And in what torm should we conceive ot
that 1 unio%owith it o:t which religiows geniuses are ao
convinced?
James approaches the formulation of his response through the
psychological area of the subconscious self.

We have already seen how,

even apart from religious considerations, there is much more to our
lives than we are aware ot or experience at 8.1J1 given time.
of religious experiences such as conversion, JJtYsticism, and

The study
pr~er

has

shown how invasions from the subliminal or transmarginal region, the
"fringes" of experience, can be a part of religious life.

James's

hypothesis then is that "whatever it ruq be on its farther side, the
•more• with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected
is on its hither side the subconscious continuation of our consoious
life."121 This approach, he feels, provides a point of contact with
psychology and science by describing!!!!!, side of religious experience
in terms they would accept, while remaining true to the experience

121

-

Ibid., P•

386.
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an external control.
opens the door.

But describing this side of the "more" just barely

It is regarding the other side that various over-beliefs

are tormed.
James then states his own

~othesis

or over-belief regarding the

farther aide of the "more" which comes in contact with a person through
his subconscious region.

'The further limits of our being plunge, it

1

seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the
aens.ible and merely 'understandable' world.

Name it the 1D1stical region,

or the supernatural region, whichever you cboose. 11122 God is the name
used by Christians for this higher part of the universe.

And

it is in

'

the phenomenon of ''prayerful communion" that God produces real effects
upon us.

Through prayerful communion

work is actually done upon our finite persona1ity, for we
are turned into new men, and consequences in the WaJ ot
conduct follow in the natural world upon our regenerative
change. But that which produces effects within another
reality must be termed a reality itself, so I feel as if
we had no philosophic '~use for calling the unseen or
mystical world unreal.
124
In other words, "God is real since he produces real etfecta."
To a person used to the elaborate arguments for the existence of
God and their detailed results, Jamea•s conclusion may seem meager indeed.

He does not in tact feel that his study of religious experience

can even go so far as to say that God ia infinite, only that he ia a.
higher power in contact with us and friendly to ua.

But this is a

belief he can act upon and that gi'V99meaning to his lite.

-

122Ibid.,
P• 389.
123Ibid!>t
P• 389,,
124Ibid.
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We and God have business with each other; and in opening ourselves to his influence our deepest desti~ is fulfilled.
The universe, at those parts of it which our personal being
constitutes, takes a turn genuinely for the worse or tor the
better in prop~~ion as each one or us fulfills or evades
Qod•s demand.a.

The rational basis for religious experience in William James does
not lie, therefore, in theoretical reason alone; it is not a universally
valid logical proof for the existence of God.

Rational for him includes

the practical reason as well as the theoretical.

In response to inner

needs, it is rational to go beyond scientific evidence while remaining
true to it, because there is so much more to a man's life than what
science can capture.

In fact, if a person is to find meaning, going be-

Y<>id scientific evidence is a basic need.
Religious belief, as a particular way of going beyond the evidence,
answers this need in a manner that is uniquely suited to the basic structure of man.

Whether through the religion of healtlv-mindedness, or for

the twice-born person through a process of conversion, a man is put in
touch with a higher power and finds within himself a new center of spiritual energy.

This contact with a higher power meets man's basic needs

and challenges his powers in a way that other world views cannot.

Natu-

ral religion, scepticism, materialism, and purely humanistic ethics all

:tall short and lea.Ye a person with the feeling that the world is irrational, as James has argued above.

The world view of theism which

answers the baaic needs of man has roots in his ordinary experience; religious experiences are first of all human experiences, of the same type
as those common to all men.

This shared experience is likewise a

rational basis, since the structure of religious experience is therefore
125
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389.

96

familiar and does not jar a person's sentiment of rationality.
The religious IvPothesis

~'her

commends itself as reasonable by

its fruits for the world in the beneficial effects it produces through
the energy of the aaintfy person.

Especially his tenderness and charity

are prophetic ot a more ideal age of man, and can often be creative of
that ideal.

But a person must have a sufficiently wide range of interests,

and his intellect must be capable of avoiding harmt'ul fanaticism in

practice, just as it must criticize deficiencies in theory.
In addition to these subjective indications of its rationality,
from its basis in common experience the religious IvPothesis at least
points to the actual existence of a higher power, actual becauso this
power seems to work real effects in a person through prayerful communion.
This is tar from a universally valid logical proof, and yet it doea not
contradict scientific evidence.

According to Jamea•a over-belief, this

higher power would work its effects through the subconscious region.

His

view thus is !aithtul to psychological evidence, going beyond pa,chologr
without going against it.
Given man•a situation, existing in a world much larger than any
part he can put into words at a given time, this limited amount of objective evidence for religion 11181 be all he can hope for.

For William

James the religious hypothesis was rational enough to live by, and in
fact to call forth a creative and meaningful life in the world.
aak no more from

~

theory.

He would
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